Residential Schools

IN THE FIRST FEW DECADES of the life of the new Canadian nation, when the government turned to address the constitutional responsibility for Indians and their lands assigned by the Constitution Act, 1867, it adopted a policy of assimilation. As described in the previous chapter, the roots of this policy were in the pre-Confederation period. It was a policy designed to move communities, and eventually all Aboriginal peoples, from their helpless 'savage' state to one of self-reliant 'civilization' and thus to make in Canada but one community — a non-Aboriginal, Christian one.

Of all the steps taken to achieve that goal, none was more obviously a creature of Canada's paternalism toward Aboriginal people, its civilizing strategy and its stern assimilative determination than education. In the mind of Duncan Campbell Scott, the most influential senior official in the department of Indian affairs in the first three decades of the twentieth century, education was "by far the most important of the many subdivisions of the most complicated Indian problem". As a potential solution to that 'problem', education held the greatest promise. It would, the minister of Indian affairs, Frank Oliver, predicted in 1908, "elevate the Indian from his condition of savagery" and "make him a self-supporting member of the state, and eventually a citizen in good standing."

It was not, however, just any model of education that carried such promise. In 1879, Sir John A. Macdonald's government, pressured by the Catholic and Methodist churches to fulfill the education clauses of the recently negotiated western treaties, had assigned Nicholas Flood Davin the task of reporting "on the working of Industrial Schools...in the United States and on the advisability of establishing similar institutions in the North-West Territories of the Dominion." Having toured U.S. schools and consulted with the U.S. commissioner of Indian affairs and "the leading men, clerical and lay who could speak with authority on the subject" in western Canada, Davin called for the "application of the principle of industrial boarding schools" — off-reserve schools that would teach the arts, crafts and industrial skills of a modern economy. Children, he advised, should be removed from their homes, as "the influence of the wigwam was stronger than that of the [day] school", and be "kept constantly within the circle of civilized conditions" — the residential school — where they would receive the "care of a mother" and an education that would fit them for a life in a modernizing Canada.
Davin's report received the unqualified support of the churches and the department, with the latter going so far as to suggest that within the wide range of assimilative policies, it would be through residential education, more than any other method, that "the solution of that problem, designated 'the Indian question' would probably be effected...".\(^7\)

Politician, civil servant and, perhaps most critically, priest and parson all felt that in developing the residential school system they were responding not only to a constitutional but to a Christian "obligation to our Indian brethren" that could be discharged only "through the medium of the children" and "therefore education must be given the foremost place".\(^8\)

At the same moment, however, they were driven by more prosaic motives. Macdonald's deputy superintendent general of Indian affairs, L. Vankoughnet, assured him that Indian expenditures were "a good investment", for in due course Aboriginal people, "instead of being supported from the revenue of the country...would contribute largely to the same."\(^9\)

The socializing power of education had a similarly self-serving utility. Schools were part of a network of institutions that were to minister to industrial society's need for order, lawfulness, labour and security of property.\(^10\) Scott admitted frankly that the provision of education to Indian communities was indispensable, for without it and "with neglect", they "would produce an undesirable and often dangerous element in society."\(^11\)

Residential schools were more than a component in the apparatus of social construction and control. They were part of the process of nation building and the concomitant marginalization of Aboriginal communities. The department's inspector of education wrote in 1900 that the education of Aboriginal people in frontier districts was an important consideration, not only as an economical measure to be demanded for the welfare of the country and the Indians, themselves, but in order that crime may not spring up and peaceful conditions be disturbed as that element which is the forerunner and companion of civilization penetrates the country and comes into close contact with the natives. That benefit will accrue to both the industrial occupants of the country covered by treaty and to the Indians by weaning a number from the chase and inclining them to industrial pursuits is patent to those who see [that] a growing need of intelligent labour must occur as development takes place.\(^12\)

The Aboriginal leader George Manuel, a residential school graduate, was rather more blunt. The schools, he wrote,

were the laboratory and production line of the colonial system...the colonial system that was designed to make room for European expansion into a vast empty wilderness needed an Indian population that it could describe as lazy and shiftless...the colonial system required such an Indian for casual labour...\(^13\)

Selfless Christian duty and self-interested statecraft were the foundations of the residential school system. The edifice itself was erected by a church/government partnership that would manage the system jointly until 1969. In this task the churches —
Anglican, Catholic, Methodist and Presbyterian — led the way. Indeed, their energetic proselytizing resulted in the opening of residential schools in Ontario, the north-west and British Columbia even before the Davin report was submitted in 1879. Thereafter, the system — a combination of boarding schools built close to or in reserve communities and Davin's centrally located industrial schools — was expanded rapidly, reaching a high point with 80 schools in 1931 (see Table 10.1) and growing again in the 1950s as part of the nation's post-war expansion into Inuit homelands. It was maintained until the mid-1980s. Schools were built in every province and territory except Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and Newfoundland.\(^{14}\) They registered children from every Aboriginal culture — Indian, Inuit, and Métis children too — though the federal government assumed no constitutional responsibility for Métis people.\(^{15}\) While Métis children would be invisible, rarely mentioned in the records, they were nevertheless there and were treated the same as all the children were.

**TABLE 10.1**

**Residential Schools, 1931**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>School (RC)</th>
<th>School (PR)</th>
<th>School (CE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>Shubenacadie (RC)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>Albany Mission (RC)</td>
<td>Cecilia Jeffrey (PR)</td>
<td>Chapleau (CE)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Frances (RC)</td>
<td>Fort William (RC)</td>
<td>Kenora (RC)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>McIntosh (RC)</td>
<td>Mohawk (CE)</td>
<td>Moose Fort (CE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mount Elgin (UC)</td>
<td>Shingwauk Home (CE)</td>
<td>Sioux Lookout (CE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spanish (RC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>Birtle (PR)</td>
<td>Brandon (UC)</td>
<td>Cross Lake (RC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elkhorn (CE)</td>
<td>Fort Alexander (RC)</td>
<td>MacKay (CE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norway House (UC)</td>
<td>Pine Creek (RC)</td>
<td>Portage la Prairie (UC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sandy Bay (RC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>Beauval (RC)</td>
<td>Cowessess (RC)</td>
<td>Duck Lake (RC)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>File Hills (UC)</td>
<td>Gordon's (CE)</td>
<td>Guy (RC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lac La Ronge (CE)</td>
<td>Muscowequan (RC)</td>
<td>Onion Lake (CE)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Onion Lake (RC)</td>
<td>Qu'Appelle (RC)</td>
<td>Round Lake (UC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St. Phillips (RC)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thunderchild (RC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>Blood (RC)</td>
<td>Blue Quills (RC)</td>
<td>Crowfoot (RC)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Edmonton (UC)</td>
<td>Ermineskins (RC)</td>
<td>Holy Angels (RC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lesser Slave Lake (CE)</td>
<td>Morley (UC)</td>
<td>Old Sun's (CE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St. Albert (RC)</td>
<td>St. Bernard (RC)</td>
<td>St. Bruno (RC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>St. Cyprian (CE)</td>
<td>St. Paul's (CE)</td>
<td>Sacred Heart (RC)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sturgeon Lake (RC)</td>
<td>Vermilion (RC)</td>
<td>Wabasca (CE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wabasca (RC)</td>
<td>Whitefish Lake (CE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northwest Territories</td>
<td>Aklavik (RC)</td>
<td>Fort Resolution (RC)</td>
<td>Hay River (CE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 1931 there were 44 Roman Catholic (RC), 21 Church of England (CE), 13 United Church (UC) and 2 Presbyterian (PR) schools. These proportions among the denominations were constant throughout the history of the system.

In Quebec two schools, Fort George (RC) and Fort George (CE), were opened before the Second World War. Four more were added after the war: Amos, Pointe Bleue, Sept-Îles and La Tuque.

Put simply, the residential school system was an attempt by successive governments to determine the fate of Aboriginal people in Canada by appropriating and reshaping their future in the form of thousands of children who were removed from their homes and communities and placed in the care of strangers. Those strangers, the teachers and staff, were, according to Hayter Reed, a senior member of the department in the 1890s, to employ "every effort...against anything calculated to keep fresh in the memories of the children habits and associations which it is one of the main objects of industrial education to obliterate." Marching out from the schools, the children, effectively re-socialized, imbued with the values of European culture, would be the vanguard of a magnificent metamorphosis: the 'savage' was to be made 'civilized', made fit to take up the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship.

Tragically, the future that was created is now a lamentable heritage for those children and the generations that came after, for Aboriginal communities and, indeed, for all Canadians. The school system's concerted campaign "to obliterate" those "habits and associations", Aboriginal languages, traditions and beliefs, and its vision of radical re-socialization, were compounded by mismanagement and underfunding, the provision of inferior educational services and the woeful mistreatment, neglect and abuse of many children — facts that were known to the department and the churches throughout the history of the school system.

In the course of that history there were those who understood that such a terrible legacy was being created. In 1943, R. Hoey, the department's superintendent of welfare and training, on receiving from the principal of St. George's School (located on the Fraser River, just north of Lyttons, B.C.) a set of shackles that had been used routinely "to chain runaways to the bed" and reports of other abuses at the school, wrote, "I can understand now why there appears to be such a widespread prejudice on the part of the Indians against residential schools. Such memories do not fade out of the human consciousness very rapidly." Nevertheless, with very few exceptions, neither senior departmental officials nor churchmen nor members of Parliament raised their voices against the
assumptions that underlay the system or its abusive character. And, of course, the memory did not and has not faded. It has persisted, festered and become a sorrowful monument, still casting a deep shadow over the lives of many Aboriginal people and communities and over the possibility of a new relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians.

1. The Vision and Policies of Residential School Education

1.1 The Vision

...it is to the young that we must look for a complete change of condition.18

The tragic legacy of residential education began in the late nineteenth century with a three-part vision of education in the service of assimilation. It included, first, a justification for removing children from their communities and disrupting Aboriginal families; second, a precise pedagogy for re-socializing children in the schools; and third, schemes for integrating graduates into the non-Aboriginal world.

The vision sprang from and was shaped and sustained by the representations of departmental officials and churchmen of the character, circumstances and destiny of the nation's Aboriginal population. For such social reformers in Canada, and indeed throughout the world of European empires, the contact between expansive and 'mature' non-Aboriginal culture and indigenous cultures in their 'infancy' imperilled the survival of Aboriginal peoples. According to an 1886 report from the department's inspector of schools for the north-west, for example, resource development and settlement had prevented Indian communities from following that course of evolution which has produced from the barbarian of the past the civilized man of today. It is not possible for him to be allowed slowly to pass through successive stages, from pastoral to an agricultural life and from an agricultural one, to one of manufacturing, commerce or trade as we have done. He has been called upon suddenly and without warning to enter upon a new existence.19

The need for government intervention to liberate these savage people from the retrograde influence of a culture that could not cope with rapidly changing circumstances was pressing and obvious. Without it, the inspector continued, the Indian "must have failed and perished miserably and he would have died hard entailing expense and disgrace upon the Country." The exact point of intervention that would "force a change in [the Indian's] condition" was equally clear — "it is to the young that we must look for a complete change of condition."

Only in the children could hope for the future reside, for only children could undergo "the transformation from the natural condition to that of civilization".20 Adults could not join the march of progress. They could not be emancipated from their "present state of ignorance, superstition and helplessness";21 they were "physically, mentally and morally...unfitted to bear such a complete metamorphosis".22 Under departmental tutelage, adults might make some slight advance. They could, Davin suggested, "be
taught to do a little at farming and at stock raising and to dress in a more civilized fashion, but that is all." They were, in the words of the Reverend E.F. Wilson, founder of the Shingwauk residential school, "the old unimprovable people."

The central difficulty in this analysis was not that adults were lost to civilization, but that they were an impediment to it. While they could not learn, they could, as parents, teach their children. Through them to their children and on through successive generations ran the "influence of the wigwam". If the children's potential was to be realized, it could only be outside the family. As E. Dewdney, superintendent general of Indian affairs in Macdonald's second government, reasoned, children therefore had to be removed from "deleterious home influences"; they must be, the Archbishop of St. Boniface added, "caught young to be saved from what is on the whole the degenerating influence of their home environment." Their parents were, by the light of the vision's compelling logic, unfit. Only Frank Oliver demurred, pointing out the essentially un-Christian implication of this formative conclusion:

I hope you will excuse me for so speaking but one of the most important commandments laid upon the human by the divine is love and respect by children for parents. It seems strange that in the name of religion a system of education should have been instituted, the foundation principle of which not only ignored but contradicted this command.

No one took any notice of the minister, however, for no one involved in Indian affairs doubted for a moment that separation was justified and necessary and that residential schools were therefore indispensable. Such institutions would, Parliament had been informed in 1889, undoubtedly reclaim the child "from the uncivilized state in which he has been brought up" by bringing "him into contact from day to day with all that tends to effect a change in his views and habits of life." In its enthusiasm for the schools, the department went so far as to suggest that it would be "highly desirable, if it were practicable, to obtain entire possession of all Indian children after they attain to the age of seven or eight years, and keep them at schools...until they have had a thorough course of instruction".

The common wisdom of the day that animated the educational plans of church and state was that Aboriginal children had to be rescued from their "evil surroundings", isolated from parents, family and community, and "kept constantly within the circle of civilized conditions". There, through a purposeful course of instruction that Vankoughnet described as "persistent" tuition, a great transformation would be wrought in the children. By a curriculum aimed at radical cultural change — the second critical element of the vision — the 'savage' child would surely be re-made into the 'civilized' adult.

The school, as department and church officials conceived it, was a circle, an all-encompassing environment of re-socialization with a curriculum that comprised not only academic and practical training but the whole life of the child in the school. This constituted the basic design of the schools and was maintained, with little variation, for most of the history of the system.
The classroom work of the teachers and students was to be guided by the standard provincial curriculum. To this was added equally important training in practical skills. The department held firm to Davin's industrial model, convinced that no system of Indian training is right that does not endeavour to develop all the abilities, remove prejudice against labour, and give courage to compete with the rest of the world. The Indian problem exists owing to the fact that the Indian is untrained to take his place in the world. Once teach him to do this, and the solution is had.33

In every school, therefore, the children were to receive instruction in a range of subjects, including, for the boys, agriculture, carpentry, shoemaking, blacksmithing, tinsmithing and printing and, for the girls, sewing, shirt making, knitting, cooking, laundry, dairying, ironing and general household duties. As the curriculum was delivered in a half-day system until after the Second World War, with students spending half the day in the classroom and the other half in practical activities, trades training took place both in shops and in learn-by-doing chores. These chores had the additional benefit for the school of providing labour — on the farm and in the residences, bakehouse, laundry and dairy that made operation of the institution possible.34

Although these academic and practical courses might clothe the children in the skills and experience they needed to survive and prosper, the department and the churches realized that the children would have to undergo much more profound socialization. Skills would be useless unless accompanied by the values of the society the children were destined to join. The seeds of those values were, of course, embedded in each and every academic subject, in the literature they read, the poetry they recited, and the songs they were taught to sing. As well, however, in its 1896 program of study, the department directed that an ethics course be taught in each grade. In the first year, the students were to be taught the "practice of cleanliness, obedience, respect, order, neatness", followed in subsequent years by "Right and wrong", "Independence. Self-respect", "Industry. Honesty. Thrift", and "Patriotism....Self-maintenance. Charity." In the final year, they were confronted by the "Evils of Indian Isolation", "Labour the Law of Life" and "Home and public duties".35

Cardinal among these virtues was moral training for, as a memorandum from the Catholic principals explained, "all true civilization must be based on moral law." Christianity had to supplant the children's Aboriginal spirituality, which was nothing more than "pagan superstition" that "could not suffice" to make them "practise the virtues of our civilization and avoid its attendant vices." In the schools, as well as in the communities, there could be no compromise, no countenancing Aboriginal beliefs and rituals, which, "being the result of a free and easy mode of life, cannot conform to the intense struggle for life which our social conditions require."36

The children were not only to imbibe those values, and a new faith, they were to live them. The school was to be a home — a Canadian one. On crossing its threshold, the children were entering a non-Aboriginal world where, with their hair shorn and dressed in European clothes, they would leave behind the 'savage' seasonal round of hunting and
gathering for a life ordered by the hourly precision of clocks and bells and an annual calendar of rituals, the festivals of church and state — Christmas, Victoria Day, Dominion Day and St. Jean Baptiste Day — that were the rapid, steady pulse of the industrial world. According to Dewdney, students had to be taught that "there should be an object for the employment of every moment", and thus the "routine...the recurrence of the hours for meals, classwork, outside duties...are all of great importance in the training and education, with a view to future usefulness".  

In school, in chapel, at work and even at play the children were to learn the Canadian way. Recreation was re-creation. Games and activities would not be the "boisterous and unorganized games" of "savage" youth. Rather they were to have brass bands, football, cricket, baseball and above all hockey "with the well regulated and...strict rules that govern our modern games", prompting "obedience to discipline" and thus contributing to the process of moving the children along the path to civilization.  

None of the foregoing would be achieved, however, unless the children were first released from the shackles that tied them to their parents, communities and cultures. The civilizers in the churches and the department understood this and, moreover, that it would not be accomplished simply by bringing the children into the school. Rather it required a concerted attack on the ontology, on the basic cultural patterning of the children and on their world view. They had to be taught to see and understand the world as a European place within which only European values and beliefs had meaning; thus the wisdom of their cultures would seem to them only savage superstition. A wedge had to be driven not only physically between parent and child but also culturally and spiritually. Such children would then be separated forever from their communities, for even if they went home they would, in the words of George Manuel, bring "the generation gap with them". Only in such a profound fashion could the separation from savagery and the re-orientation as civilized be assured.

That the department and churches understood the central challenge they faced in civilizing the children as that of overturning Aboriginal ontology is seen in their identification of language as the most critical issue in the curriculum. It was through language that children received their cultural heritage from parents and community. It was the vital connection that civilizers knew had to be cut if progress was to be made. E.F. Wilson informed the department that at Shingwauk school, "We make a great point of insisting on the boys talking English, as, for their advancement in civilization, this is, of all things, the most necessary." Aboriginal languages could not carry the burden of civilization; they could not "impart ideas which, being entirely outside the experience and environment of the pupils and their parents, have no equivalent expression in their native language." Those ideas were the core concepts of European culture — its ontology, theology and values. Without the English language, the department announced in its annual report of 1895, the Aboriginal person is "permanently disabled" and beyond the pale of assimilation for, "So long as he keeps his native tongue, so long will he remain a community apart."
The only effective road to English or French, however, and thus a necessary pre-
condition for moving forward with the multi-faceted civilizing strategy, was to stamp out
Aboriginal languages in the schools and in the children. The importance of this to the
department and the churches cannot be overstated. In fact, the entire residential school
project was balanced on the proposition that the gate to assimilation was unlocked only
by the progressive destruction of Aboriginal languages. With that growing silence would
come the dying whisper of Aboriginal cultures. To that end, the department ordered that
"the use of English in preference to the Indian dialect must be insisted upon."43

It was left to school principals to implement that directive, to teach the languages of
'civilization' — French in Quebec and English in all other parts of Canada, including
Francophone areas, and to prevent the language of 'savagery' from being spoken in the
school. Some instituted imaginative systems of positive reinforcement through rewards,
prizes or privileges for the exclusive use of English. More often than not, however, the
common method was punishment. Children throughout the history of the system were
beaten for speaking their language.44

The third and final part of the vision was devoted to the graduates, their future life and
their contribution to the civilization of their communities. It was this aspect of the vision
that underwent the greatest change. While the ideology of the curriculum and its goal of
extensive cultural replacement remained constant, the perceived utility of the schools to
the overall strategy of assimilation and their relationship to Aboriginal communities
underwent substantial revision. There were, in fact, two residential school policies. The
first, in the long period before the Second World War, placed the school at the heart of
the strategy to disestablish communities through assimilation. In the subsequent period,
the residential school system served a secondary role in support of the integration of
children into the provincial education system and the modernization of communities.

Initially, the schools were seen as a bridge from the Aboriginal world into non-Aboriginal
communities. That passage was marked out in clear stages: separation, socialization and,
finally, assimilation through enfranchisement. By this last step, the male graduate could
avail himself of the enfranchisement provisions of the Indian Act, leaving behind his
Indian status and taking on the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship.

Each stage in the passage had its difficulties, and the department was fully aware that its
task was not completed with the training that led to graduation. Indeed, it declared in its
annual report of 1887, "it is after its completion that the greatest care...needs to be
exercised, in order to prevent retrogression." Retrogression — cultural backsliding —
was the great fear. Once the connection between child and community had been broken it
should not be re-established; the child should never again fall under the influence of
Indian "prejudices and traditions" or the "degradations of savage life."45 To prevent this
unhappy occurrence, the department reported in 1887, it would be best "to prevent those
whose education at an industrial institution...has been completed from returning to the
reserves". They were instead to be placed in the non-Aboriginal world and secured there
by employment in the trade they had learned at the school, "so as to cause them to reside
in towns, or, in the case of farmers, in settlements of white people, and thus become
amalgamated with the general community." By implication, the future was not only one of amalgamating growing numbers of employable graduates but also the progressive decay and final disappearance of reserve communities.

Reality intervened in this strategy, however, and, indeed, the department and the churches did not exercise the "greatest care" of graduates. There was no placement program, and even if there had been, situations were not available in towns or "settlements of white people". "Race prejudice", an Indian agent informed the department, "is against them and I am afraid that it will take time, under the circumstances, before they can compete with their white brothers in the trades." By 1896, the department had to face the fact that "for the majority [of graduates], for the present at least, there appears to be no alternative" but to return to the reserves. That present became the future; there were always but few openings for graduates. With the exception of temporary labour shortages during the war, it was obvious that "no appreciable number of graduates of the Schools will be in a position to earn a livelihood by working as a craftsman among whites."

The second fact that had to be faced was that in returning to their communities, as Reed predicted, "there will be a much stronger tendency for the few to merge into the many than to elevate them." A great proportion of the graduates would go "back to the ways of the old teepee life", to the "nomadic habits of his ancestors." They could not, one principal reported "stand firm" or "overcome this tendency to drift with the current that carries so many of their own people."

The department and the churches recognized the problem — one that cut to the very heart of their strategy, blunting the usefulness of the schools and in fact so calling into question the industrial school model that, in 1922, it was abandoned in favour of the simpler boarding school, thereafter called a residential school. They recognized it but, as would be the case so often in the history of the system when it faced difficulties, they did very little apart from discuss it and formulate proposals.

In 1898, the deputy superintendent general, James Smart, recognizing the impossibility of countering the drift back to reserves, decided to make a virtue out of necessity. He redesigned the system, supplementing its original emphasis on the enfranchisement of individual graduates with the additional goal of developing the communities to which the graduate returned. It would now be the object "to have each pupil impart what he has gained to his less fortunate fellows, and in fact become a centre of improving influence for the elevation of his race". The graduates could be, the principal of the Regina industrial school predicted, a "great moral force in the uplift of the life of the reserve", providing "an object lesson" in farming, gardening, housekeeping, the care of the sick and "maintaining sanitary conditions about their homes."

By 1901, the department had initiated an experiment, the File Hills colony on the Peepeekeesis reserve, designed to release the graduates' uplifting developmental potential. The colony, under the close supervision of the agent W.M. Graham, was a model settlement of 15 former pupils, each allocated an 80-acre lot, horses, farming equipment, lumber and hardware for houses. Departmental expenses were to be recouped
from the young farmers when they achieved an adequate income and the funds transferred to "help others make a like start." 57

Reports on the colony were promising in 1902 but in ensuing years they were much less so, 58 with the graduates described as being "all the way from 'lazy and indifferent' to 'making favourable or satisfactory progress'." 59 Reflecting these assessments, or perhaps because the experiment was, as the historian Olive Dickason has suggested, "too costly for the budget-minded department", 60 Duncan Campbell Scott chose not to extend it. Instead, he merely called upon principals and agents to co-ordinate the return of graduates to reserves and, so that they should not be thrown "entirely upon [their] own resources", he announced a modest start-up program — offering graduates "a gift of oxen and implements...and the granting of a loan which must be repaid within a certain time, and for which an agreement is signed by the pupil." 61

These loans substituted for what could have been a more ambitious attempt to resolve the problem of the graduates. 62 As the United Church's Association of Indian Workers in Saskatchewan pointed out in 1930, there continued to be "a missing link that should be forged into the present system along the line of 'Follow up work'." 63 Without such a link, without any effective "control over the graduates", 64 they were destined to return to the reserves, where rather than being that "great moral force", 65 they would fall under "the depressing influence of those whose habits still largely pertain to savage life". 66 For those ex-pupils and for the communities, assimilation would remain an ever-distant departmental goal.

1.2 Changing Policies

...the interests of the children are best served by leaving them with their parents. 67

The fact that the department stumbled in planning this final step to assimilation was augmented by an even more disturbing reality. As a general rule, at no time in the history of the system did the schools produce the well-educated graduates that were the prerequisite for both the original scheme of enfranchisement and Smart's amended community-based strategy. Indeed, the use of the word graduate was rather misleading, for very few children completed the full course of study, though it is clear that many children did receive some of the basics of a rudimentary education and a few children reached advanced levels. Even for those that did complete the program, most schools did not provide the training that was such an essential part of the residential vision. According to a review of the educational performance of the system up to 1950, conducted in 1968 by R.F. Davey, the director of educational services, the practical training that had been in place "contained very little of instructional value but consisted mainly of the performance of repetitive, routine chores of little or no educational value." 68

Davey's judgement of the quality of the academic program was equally harsh. The system had failed to keep pace with advances in the general field of education and, because the schools were often in isolated locations and generally offered low salaries, the system had been unable to attract qualified staff. A departmental study quoted by Davey found that,
as late as 1950, "over 40 per cent of the teaching staff had no professional training. Indeed, some had not even graduated from high school." Moreover, teachers worked under the most difficult conditions. Language training was a persistent problem, and the half-day system reduced class time to the extent that it was, Davey concluded, virtually impossible for students to make significant progress. He noted in his report that in 1945, when there were 9,149 residential school students, the annual report of the department showed only "slightly over 100 students enrolled in grades above grade VIII and...there was no record of any students beyond the grade IX level."

In the 1950s and '60s the department made improvements in the educational component of the residential system. Additional departmental educational supervisory staff were employed, in 1951 the half-day system was abandoned, the department assumed direct responsibility for the hiring and remuneration of teachers in 1954, and, in an attempt to attract more competent staff, teachers were "placed upon salary scales which bore some relationship to the salaries paid across the country."

In attracting more competent staff, the department was able to achieve considerable success quickly. By 1957, the number of unqualified teachers in residential schools had been reduced by 50 per cent, and in 1962 the department reported that 91.1 per cent of the teachers it employed were fully qualified. It was not easy to keep the percentage up, however, and two decades later the department admitted that it still had "difficulty in recruiting and retaining education staff." Nevertheless, the department could track advances in educational attainment. By 1959, the number of children in grades 9 to 13 in residential and day schools had increased from none in 1945 to 2,144, and in the next decade, it rose even more rapidly to 6,834, which was just over 10 per cent of the total school (day and residential) population.

All these efforts were overshadowed by what had been and continued to be a most fundamental impediment. Both the curriculum and the pedagogy, which were not in any way appropriate to the culture of the students, made it difficult for the children to learn. This fact could not have escaped the department's and the churches' attention, for on a number of occasions provincial school inspectors, employed by the department to assess the educational condition of the schools, had made the point that the "curricula in use in various provinces are not necessarily the courses of study adapted for use in Indian schools." "It should not be forgotten", Inspector Warkentin informed the department in 1951, "that there is very often a very wide difference in the life experiences of Indian children and white children, a difference which should be reflected in courses of study." Another inspector, while reinforcing this point, added a call for a change in pedagogy to one that would be more familiar to the children. In considering the subject of social studies, for example, he advised that "this work be taught by a due recognition of Indian background. Story telling can be used more effectively to arouse interest."

Although the department admitted in the 1970s that the curriculum had not been geared to the children's "sociological needs", it did little to rectify that situation. A national survey was undertaken "to identify textbooks that the Indian people considered offensive, and steps were taken to remove these books from the schools." Research was
commissioned from a number of universities to address "the absence from the school curriculum generally of an Indian cultural component", but none of it was of the scope that would ever have met Warkentin's suggestion that a comprehensive "curriculum specially aimed at the instruction of Indian children should be drawn up". There is no indication in school records that the results of any of this research found its way into the classrooms of residential schools.

Efforts to improve the school program in the post-war period were undercut further by one final factor — the system was gradually abandoned. In 1948, the federal government — on the recommendation of the joint parliamentary committee on Indian affairs, which in hearings held beginning in 1946, had received strong representations from Indian groups for "an end to the policy and practice of segregated education" — initiated an extensive redesign of its Aboriginal education strategy that not only took the emphasis off residential schools but determined that the system should be shut down completely as soon as possible. Departmental efforts and resources were reallocated to a new policy, away from the residential system to creation of a day school system and, most significantly, integration by "transferring Indian children to provincial schools, and federal schools to provincial administrative school units."

The representations of Indian groups cannot be wholly discounted in this development, but in fact the move away from the traditional strategy began even before the war, and the dynamics that motivated it were, as always, a non-Aboriginal assimilative strategy and more mundane considerations — financial ones in this instance. In 1943, R.A. Hoey appeared before a special parliamentary committee on reconstruction and re-establishment. Reacting to statements by one of the committee members — that residential schools "lose a great deal of the value of the education", because they "segregate the children" from their community, and that if children were educated in a day school "[y]ou would educate the parents and the children together" — Hoey admitted that he too had doubts about the efficacy of residential schools. His personal preference was "to see residential schools slowly and gradually closed".

Hoey took back to the department the clear understanding that the "Indians in the judgement of the committee, should be encouraged to attend white schools" and that this would probably be the policy of the future. He was, as the department would be, in total agreement with such a policy directive. As he pointed out to the deputy minister, there was a definite educational benefit in giving the children the "opportunity of associating with white children during their formative years". Such experience would increase the likelihood of their absorbing non-Aboriginal culture or, as Davey characterized it two decades later, would "quicken and give meaning to the accultural process through which [the children] are passing". There also appeared to be a financial advantage for the government, in that integration, Hoey believed, "would in the end be substantially less than the cost of establishing" and operating an exclusively federal system of residential and day schools.

The policy of integration, though an apparently radical redirection of educational policy, was not based on a wholly new vision of education's role in the quest for assimilation. It
built upon Smart's idea of community development, but in this version, in a most surprising break with the civilizing logic of the late nineteenth century, an active part was assigned to the parents, whose dangerously savage character and baleful influence appear mysteriously to have disappeared. Indeed, the department took the position that maintaining the parent/child relationship was key — that "there can be no complete substitute for the care and concern of parents and the security which children feel when living at home". Therefore,

It is considered that the parents, wherever possible, should assume the responsibility for the care of their children, and that the interests of the children are best served by leaving them with their parents when home circumstances and other factors are favourable.

This now-valued parental involvement was even given institutional form in federal day and residential schools. In 1956, the department set up a number of school committees "to stimulate parental and community interest, and to provide experience for the further involvement of Indians in the management of education." The committees, made up of band members, were to act as "advisory boards to departmental staff" and were to be "involved in the operation of the schools", being given authority for the "school lunch program, daily school transportation, repairs and the maintenance of school buildings...and they also present the annual operating budget to the district superintendent of education." While the department expanded this initiative, establishing some 180 such committees by 1971, there was no increase in their authority. Most noticeably, they were given no control over curriculum, perhaps so that whatever traces of the influence of the wigwam still existed might be effectively excluded from the classroom.

There is, indeed, reason to suspect that integration — despite the apparent cultural sensitivity of the textbook survey and commissioned research — did not lessen, and may even have increased, the corrosive impact of education on the culture of the children. Again, as in the original vision, the question of language was the essential template shaping the policy. The department realized that "the most formidable handicap that faces the Indian child entering [the provincial] school" was the requirement to be able to function in English (and in French or English in Quebec). To that end, the greatest emphasis in this period was on the development of a language arts program, and regional language specialists were employed to help the children "overcome any language difficulties", in the belief that "much of the progress in Indian education" was to be realized by these "improved methods of language instruction."

Most significantly, integration meant repositioning the residential school system. No longer the main thrust of the assimilative strategy, it became, as the department described it, "a supplementary service" for children "who for very special reasons, cannot commute to federal day schools or provincial schools from their homes." The new organizing principle of the policy was "that in educational services, everything possible will be done to enable families to stay together, so children will not have to be separated from their parents needlessly."
The whole educational system could not, of course, be remodelled overnight to conform to this new dictum. Rather the change in status occurred school by school, at different times in different parts of the country owing to local circumstances - for example, the development of reserve roads to allow busing of children to day schools, the construction of schools close to communities, and the progress of integration, which could not go forward without negotiating local school board and provincial agreements. The residential school system therefore comprised, at any point in time, a spectrum of different types of residential schools — from those that remained classic residential schools because of community isolation, to those that combined "residential and day school with a preponderance of day students", to those that became hostels or student residences for children brought in from distant communities to provincial schools during the day. There were even some that combined hostel, residential and day school, providing boarding facilities only for those pupils attending a nearby provincial school, boarding facilities and classroom instruction for others and classroom instruction only for day pupils.94

Finally, a boarding home program, involving the placement of high school students "in carefully selected private homes", was also introduced and substituted for residential assignment of children.95

The overall intention, of course, was for all residential schools to be closed as soon as implementation of the integration policy reduced enrolments. In 1948, 60 per cent of the Indian school population was enrolled in federal schools.96 In 1969, 60 per cent were in provincial schools,97 and the number of residential schools and hostels was reduced from the 72 schools operating in 1948, with 9,368 students, to 52 schools with 7,704. That the number of schools and students did not fall proportionately was attributable not only to local circumstances but to two further difficulties — opposition to closures and the emergence of a new role for the schools as social welfare institutions.

The development of a welfare function was not a completely unforeseen implication of the new integration policy. Hoey had warned the reconstruction and re-establishment committee in 1943 that there would continue to be a need for residential places for "orphans and children from disrupted homes".98 Because of "such things as alcoholism in the home, lack of supervision, serious immaturity",99 some parents would not be able, as the new policy directed, to "assume the responsibility for the care of their children".100 To reflect that reality and at the same time control and reduce residential school enrolments, an admissions policy "based upon the circumstances of the student's family"101 was adopted. In areas where federal day school attendance or integration was possible, priority was given to children deemed to be "Category 3" — those from families where "a serious problem leading to neglect of children exists". Neglect — measured, of course, against non-Aboriginal norms — was "interpreted as defined in the provincial statute of the province in which the family resides".102 In line with the general post-war trend of involving provinces in Indian affairs, provincial child welfare agencies co-operated in determining cases of neglect and in placing children in care. Residential schools were an available and apparently popular option within the wider child care system.
As the integration program expanded, many residential schools, particularly in southern Canada, where the rate of progress was most extensive, became, to a degree alarming to the department, repositories for 'neglected' children. A confidential 1966 departmental report estimated that 75 per cent of children in the schools were "from homes which, by reasons of overcrowding and parental neglect or indifference, are considered unfit for school children." This trend caused a serious bottleneck in the process of reducing enrolments. It might have been remedied by providing support to families in communities to "alleviate the situations where children year in and year out are being removed from their homes and the home situation [remains] practically the same." The more usual methods, however, appear to have been either the referral of children requiring long-term care "to a child welfare agency for foster home service" or adoption or the placement of "incorrigible" children with "an officer of a correctional or welfare agency."

As the department characterized the situation, this welfare bottleneck put it in the anomalous position of having to administer a group of schools which have a degree of independence of operation permitting them to pursue policies which are diametrically opposed to those of the Federal Government, particularly with respect to segregation and welfare. The tension created by this internal conflict is damaging to the Indian education program and confusing to the Canadian public.

Much of this conflict sprang from opposition to integration that the department had, in fact, anticipated from its old partner in education, the churches, and from "some Indian associations who dislike working with provincial governments, and from individuals, both Indian and non-Indian, who, for personal reasons, wish to keep the federal schools open."

Church opposition came almost exclusively from the Catholic church, which fought particularly hard in western Canada where, as the department noted, perhaps cynically, provinces "do not provide for separate schools". According to the church, its position was purely altruistic. In Residential Education for Indian Acculturation, a study produced in 1959 by the Oblate Indian and Eskimo Welfare Commission, the church argued that separate on-reserve education in day schools or separate residential school education provided greater educational benefits and had greater "efficiency towards acculturation". Residential schools, in addition, provided healthier living conditions, more appropriate supervision, better grouping by grade and more vocational training possibilities than the average day school. It is also usually in a better position to offer a wider range of social and recreational activities including those with non-Indians.

The church conducted an aggressive political campaign in the late 1950s and into the 1960s through the reserve-based Catholic Indian League to save the schools it managed and particularly to extend high school services through residential schools. Each closure was a battle by "pulpit, press and politicians" but they were made, school by school, normally by a complicated process of closing residences with low enrolments and transferring the remaining children to others, all the while carefully retaining the single denominational affiliation of each school.
In 1969, the federal government obviated the need for that careful process when it formally ended the partnership with the churches, effectively secularizing Aboriginal education. The department then had almost unrestrained control of the residential school system. The rate of closures in the next decade bore witness to that; by 1979, the number of schools had fallen from 52 with 7,704 students to 12 with 1,899.

The withdrawal of the churches did not clear the way forward completely, however. Bands and political associations insisted on consultation when closures were proposed and pushed for "increased responsibility in the management of student residences." In that same vein, the National Indian Brotherhood proposed in 1971 that "residence services be contracted to Indian groups having the approval of the bands served by the respective residences." Communities connected with the Blue Quills school not only prevented its closure but forced the government to turn it over to the people of the Saddle Lake-Thabaska district. The need for such co-operation became paramount after the government accepted, in 1972, the principle of Indian control of Indian education. In line with that, the department adopted the position that "major changes in the operation and administration of individual residences will be considered only in consultation with Indian parents or their representatives." In the next few years six more schools in Saskatchewan followed the Blue Quills lead. By 1986, apart from a continued funding responsibility for such schools, the department virtually came to the end of the residential school road.

The introduction of integration, the context for the final closure or transfer of the schools, was not the only significant development in the post-war period. As the nation moved north, further penetrating Indian, Métis and Inuit homelands, a whole new tier of schools was created in the Northwest Territories.

Northern Aboriginal peoples had not been untouched by the residential school system in the pre-war period. Schools in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario and Quebec had taken in children from far northern communities. Yukon Indians were served by the Anglican residential school begun at Carcross in 1902 and by the Catholic Lower Post School in British Columbia. In the Northwest Territories, residential schools operated at Fort Providence, Aklavik and Fort Resolution. Inuit students had been concentrated at the Roman Catholic and Anglican residential schools at Aklavik and Fort George on the eastern coast of James Bay in Quebec. There were, as well, federal and missionary day schools.

In March 1955, the government, through the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, incorporated these largely church-initiated developments into an official educational strategy. This administrative arrangement had been chosen to allow "a single system of schools for children of all races", facilitating "greater economy of effort" and removing "any element of segregation." There any substantial differences with the southern system ended. The presumptive scenario and educational philosophy, the vision and the attitudes toward Aboriginal people that underlay this system, bore considerable resemblance to what they had been in the south. Growing scarcity in the resources that supported the traditional hunting and gathering culture, caused in part by
incursions into the region by resource development, combined with a dramatic fall in the
price of fur and the rapid growth of population — tied, the government suggested, to
improved medical services — provided both the need and the opportunity for a new
life. It was the government's announced belief that as "[c]ivilization is now advancing
into the Arctic areas at such a rapid pace...[i]t is therefore essential that [Aboriginal
people] be assisted in every possible way to face the future in a realistic manner — in a
way which will result in their becoming true Canadian citizens...".

That assistance was to come primarily by way of "an extensive program of construction
of schools and hostels to provide better education." By 1969-1970, as plans were
finalized to transfer education to the government of the Northwest Territories, the
Northern Affairs department had completed a network of schools that included eight
"large pupil residences", with room for an average of 150 children each, and a series of
some eleven "small hostels" for up to 25 children in Arctic locations. The annual
enrolment averaged some 1,200 children.

Despite the fact that this development occurred in the 1950s and '60s, the 'frontier' nature
of the north meant that the system stressed the value of residential schools and hostels.
They were characterized, in this latest assimilative campaign, in terms that harked back to
Davin's era, as "the most effective way of giving children from primitive environments,
experience in education along the lines of civilization leading to vocational training to fit
them for occupations in the white man's economy." As in the south, the hostels brought
children of "nomadic parents" into contact with day schools to facilitate the "complete
integration of the education of the Indians and Eskimos in the north with white children
living in the same area." Again, the system would employ the acculturative medium of
"provincial curricula", with teachers being "encouraged to adapt these to the special
needs of the Eskimo child."

Residential schools and hostels were to make not only an educational contribution but
also, Northern Affairs predicted, a wider socializing, civilizing function that would serve
educational advancement. With respect to Inuit, for example, they would have the
advantage of removing children from homes that lacked "all the more desirable habits of
sanitation, cleanliness and health since the tents and snow houses in which they live are
so small and their way of life is so primitive." In the schools, it would be possible to carry
out "adequate health education programmes" which, with improvements on the
traditional diet, would "make them better able to carry on with their schooling", which
would in turn ensure their "orderly integration into the white economy."

In the north, as in the south in the days before integration, the government with its church
partners presumed to stand in the place of the children's parents, taking children into
residential schools so that they could "face the future in a realistic manner" — that being
as "true Canadian citizens". Unfortunately, the record of this national presumption,
whether traced in the north or the south cannot be drawn as a "circle of civilized
conditions."

In any evaluation of the residential school record throughout its long history, a persistent reality appears amidst shifting vision and policies. Not only did the system fail to transport Aboriginal children through the classroom to the desired assimilative destination — or even, as Davey's 1968 record witnessed, to provide adequate levels of education — it failed to cherish them. In the building, funding and management of those purported "circles of civilized conditions", it failed to make of those schools homes where children would always be well-clothed and fed, safely housed and kindly treated. Even in the post-war period, administrative and financial reforms adopted in the midst of the general reorganization of Aboriginal education could not retrieve the situation and did not reverse the chronic neglect of the system, which forced children to live in conditions and endure levels of care that fell short of acceptable standards.

The persistently woeful condition of the school system and the too often substandard care of the children were rooted in a number of factors: in the government's and churches' unrelieved underfunding of the system, in the method of financing individual schools, in the failure of the department to exercise adequate oversight and control of the schools, and in the failure of the department and the churches to ensure proper treatment of the children by staff. Those conditions constituted the context for the neglect, abuse and death of an incalculable number of children and for immeasurable damage to Aboriginal communities.

This is not the story of an aging nineteenth century structure falling into decay but of flaws, inherent in the creation and subsequent management of the system, that were never remedied. From Confederation, with two schools in operation, the system grew at the rate of some two schools a year, so that by 1904 there were 64 schools. Such growth was not the product of forethought, of a developmental strategy controlled by the government or by the department of Indian affairs. Rather it was the product of federal reactions to the force of missionary efforts across the country and the considerable force of the churches' political influence in Ottawa by which they secured funds to operate the schools. No better summary of the process of building the system can be given than that contained in a departmental briefing to the minister, Charles Stewart, in 1927: "It thus happens that Churches have been pioneers in the remote parts of the country, and with missionary funds have put up buildings and induced the department to provide funds for maintenance."

Though its senior officials were themselves dedicated to the concept of residential education, the department was in a sense driven before a whirlwind of missionary activity. No matter which way it turned — in the west, the north and into British Columbia — as it moved to implement Davin's industrial school design, the department found schools already constructed and holding classes for children. By 1907 — with 77 schools on the books, the great majority of them established by the churches, and with no sign of the flood of new schools or church petitions for support waning — the senior clerk in the education section, Martin Benson, proclaimed, with evident exasperation, "The clergy seem to be going wild on the subject of Indian education and it is time some limit should be fixed as to their demands."
Indeed, the department had already tried, unsuccessfully, to bring the system, especially its rapidly rising costs, under control. By order in council in 1892, the department introduced what Vankoughnet termed a "correct principle" — a per capita grant arrangement that remained in force until 1957. This principle was attractive because, in theory at least, it would enable the department to "know exactly where we stand", limiting the federal contribution to the schools to a fixed annual figure tied to enrolments.

This attempt by the department to "relieve the pressure of present expenditure" and to institute "economical management" on the part of the churches, to quote the order in council, was a total failure. In limiting the liability of the department, the per capita system automatically threw an increased financial burden onto the shoulders of the churches. In the case of schools where the per capita grant did not meet a large enough part of the operating costs, which were impossible to standardize owing to the differing circumstances of schools — location, access to supplies, the availability of students — or where school management continued to be faulty, churches soon claimed that their funds were oversubscribed. They returned to Ottawa, cap in hand, for additional funding and yearly made demands for increases in per capita rates. By 1904, the collective deficit was $50,000 and rising, and the auditor general demanded yet tighter control — "A rigid inspection of financial affairs should be made on behalf of the government at least once a year."

The auditor general was not alone in pushing for reform. In 1906 the Protestant churches submitted their Winnipeg Resolutions, drawn up at a conference on education. These reiterated demands they had been making each year for increased per capitas, upgrading of schools at government expense, and increased allocations for teachers' salaries. The resolutions and the deputy superintendent general's admission that the financial ills of the system lay in underfunding rather than, as the department charged constantly, in the inefficient and extravagant hands of church appointed principals, brought on the second attempt to bring order to the system. This took the form of contracts between the government and the churches, signed in 1911, in which, the minister promised,

the whole conduct and management of these schools would be covered...the responsibilities of each toward the other would be definitely fixed and the financial straits in which the churches found themselves...would in a measure be relieved by the Government.

The minister was as good as his word — in part. New, higher per capita rates, recognizing regional cost differences, were adopted, and the contracts dealt with the obligations of the churches and the government, establishing the department as senior partner in the joint management of the schools. It had primary responsibility for setting standards of care and education, including the appointment and dismissal of teachers, and it reserved the right to cancel the contract pertaining to any school not being operated according to the regulations it formulated. To that end, the churches had to hold the schools ready for inspection by the department.
The contracts were meant to mark a new beginning for the system, laying the basis for "improved relations" between the department and the churches that were in turn to result "in benefit to the physical condition and intellectual advancement of the Indian children." Such hopeful predictions were not, however, the substance of effective reform. The system soon fell back into funding and management difficulties. The contracts were to be reviewed and renewed at the end of five years, but they never were and without any legal agreement to bind the parties, they drifted back into the previous "unbusinesslike lack of arrangement" and into discord over operation of the system.

On the financial front, government intentions were overborne by a long string of excuses for continued underfunding. The First World War and then the Depression prevented significant increases or clawed back, in whole or part, those the department was able to allocate. While the Second World War pulled the country out of the Depression, it also meant cuts "to almost every appropriation" and made the department realize that "it would be exceedingly difficult to secure the funds necessary...at any time during the years that lie ahead of us."

As a result, there were never enough funds in the pre-Second World War era to satisfy the appetite of the churches or to prevent them from again encountering substantial deficits. While the department publicly contested the churches' assertion of how desperate the financial situation was, privately it had its own figures that demonstrated dramatically that the per capita, pegged at $180 in 1938, was "exceptionably low" and inadequate for the needs of the children, particularly in relation to the funding of other residential care facilities. Hoey informed the deputy superintendent general, H. McGill, that the province of Manitoba provided grants of $642 and $550 per capita respectively to the School for the Deaf and the School for Boys. Private institutions in the province were also funded more generously. The Knowles School for Boys received $362 for each boy from the Community Chest, and the Catholic church provided St. Norbert's Orphanage with $294 per capita. The residential schools fared no better in comparison with funding for similar institutions in the United States, where the Child Welfare League of America estimated that the average per capita grant of large child care institutions was $541, with smaller ones running only as low as $313.

The cumulative weight of underfunding of the system throughout this period, which pressed down on the balance books of the churches and the department and drove individual schools into debt, was nothing compared to its consequences for the schools and their students. Badly built, poorly maintained and overcrowded, the schools' deplorable conditions were a dreadful weight that pressed down on the thousands of children who attended them. For many of those children it proved to be a mortal weight. Scott, reviewing the history of the system for the new minister, Arthur Meighen, in 1918, noted that the buildings were "undoubtedly chargeable with a very high death rate among the pupils."

When the churches and the department signed the 1911 contracts, it was clear to all the partners that there was a crisis in the conditions and sanitation of the schools and, therefore, in the health of the children. They could not have failed to know it for they had
at hand two reports, one by the department's chief medical officer, Dr. P.H. Bryce, outlining in a most sensational manner the tragic impact of tuberculosis on the children, and another by a departmental accountant, F.H. Paget, who had been detailed to survey the condition of the schools in the west.

Throughout the initial stages of the unrestrained building of the system, the department had been, Duncan Campbell Scott admitted, "intensely apprehensive" about the quality and safety of the schools, which the churches routinely "erected on very primitive plans". According to an assessment of the system by Martin Benson in 1897, the department's own record was not a great deal better. Many of the buildings it was responsible for constructing, in association with the department of public works, had "been put up without due regard for the purpose for which they would be required, hurriedly constructed of poor materials, badly laid out without due provision for lighting, heating or ventilating." The department had, in fact, insisted in the north-west on the "simplest and cheapest construction."

Paget's 1908 report revealed the legacy of such a policy. The majority of the 21 schools he inspected were, like St. Paul's boarding school near Cardston, Alberta, "quite unfit for the purpose it is being used", with faulty heating, drainage and ventilation. The schools were "not modern in any respect." Moreover, his comments drew out what had become a tragic commonplace in the department — the connection between the condition of the buildings and disease, particularly the scourge of tuberculosis. From early in the history of the system, alarming health reports had come into the department from local officials and doctors tracing out a pattern of interwoven factors contributing to "the present very high death rate from this disease": overcrowding, lack of care and cleanliness and poor sanitation.

Overcrowding, the most critical dynamic in the spread of tuberculosis, was systemic, a predictable outcome of underfunding and of the per capita grant arrangement that put a premium on each student taken from a community. Senior church officials lobbied the government constantly not only for higher rates but for implementation of a compulsory education regime that would ensure that the schools earned the maximum grant possible. For their part, the principals, unable to make ends meet, as rates were rarely increased to the level of real costs, pushed to have their authorized enrolments raised. The pressure to keep schools full meant there was a tendency to take as many children as possible, often going past wise limits, with disastrous consequences. This led to bizarre recruitment techniques, including, local officials reported, "bribing and kidnapping". As well, officials were not very careful about the health of the children they brought into the schools. The Anglican Bishop of Caledonia in British Columbia admitted candidly, "The per capita grant system encourages the taking in of those physically and intellectually unfit simply to keep up numbers."

The impact of Bryce's report, submitted in 1907, which in part only repeated what was already in departmental files, stemmed from his statistical profile of the extent of tuberculosis among children in western schools. It became the stuff of headlines and critical editorial comment. Saturday Night concluded that "even war seldom shows as
large a percentage of fatalities as does the education system we have imposed upon our Indian wards. The percentage was indeed shocking. Bryce's death toll for the 1,537 children in his survey of 15 schools was 24 per cent, and this figure might have risen to 42 per cent if the children had been tracked for three years after they returned to their reserves. The rate varied from school to school going as high as 47 per cent at Old Sun's on the Blackfoot reserve. Kuper Island school in British Columbia, which was not included in Bryce's sample, had a rate of 40 per cent over its 25-year history. While a few officials and churchmen rejected Bryce's findings and attacked him as a "medical faddist," most had to agree with him, and no less an authority than Scott asserted that, system-wide, "fifty per cent of the children who passed through these schools did not live to benefit from the education which they had received therein."

Not only was this, in the words of Saturday Night, "a situation disgraceful to the country," but in the opinion of S.H. Blake, QC, who assisted in negotiations for the 1911 contracts, because the department had done nothing over the decades "to obviate the preventable causes of death, [it] brings itself within unpleasant nearness to the charge of manslaughter." The churches too bore responsibility for what Bryce characterized, in a pamphlet published in 1922, as a "national crime", but the department had a special responsibility. In the order in council of 1892 and in the 1911 contracts, it had taken to itself the authority to set standards and had instituted a regulation requiring that prospective students receive a health certificate signed by a doctor. This check, which would supposedly prevent tubercular children being taken into the schools, was — like so many other regulations relating to care of the children, such as those regarding clothes, food and discipline — implemented carelessly by the department and ignored by many school and departmental officials. Such laxity even continued, Scott admitted, in the decades after Bryce's report.

Indeed, in those decades, almost nothing was done about tuberculosis in the schools, so that Bryce's charge that "this trail of disease and death has gone on almost unchecked by any serious efforts on the part of the Department of Indian Affairs", was sorrowfully correct. The department did not even launch a full investigation of the system. Again the explanation for this persistent carelessness was, in part, the government's refusal to fund the schools adequately to carry out a program of renovations to improve health conditions, which senior officials themselves proposed, or to undertake special measures, recommended by health authorities, to intervene in the case of sick children. In a number of instances it did implement, because it was relatively cheap, a radical course of action — mass surgery, performed on school tables, to remove teeth, tonsils and adenoids, believed to be the frequent seats of infection. Not surprisingly, conditions did not improve; schools in 1940 were still not being maintained "in a reasonable state", and the few reports extant on the health of the children, which are scattered and sketchy (for the department never set up a procedure to monitor health) point to the continuation of alarmingly high rates of infection.

The dramatic tuberculosis story, which chronicles what Bryce suggested was the government's "criminal disregard" for the "welfare of the Indian wards of the nation", cannot be allowed to distract attention from the fact that the care of the children in almost
every other area was also tragically substandard. Throughout the history of the system many children were, as the principal of St. George's testified in 1922, "ill-fed and ill-clothed and turned out into the cold to work", trapped and "unhappy with a feeling of slavery existing in their minds" and with no escape but in "thought".177

It is difficult to assess how widespread neglect was in the area of food and clothing, for again the department had no reporting procedure, and there is evidence of a fair deal of duplicity on the part of the churches, or individual principals, anxious to make the most favourable impression. A comment in 1936 by A. Hamilton, a local departmental official, on the children at Birtle school, just outside Birtle, Manitoba, symbolizes the situation.

In fairness I want to add that all the children have good clothes but these are kept for Sundays and when the children go downtown — in other words when out where they can be seen, they are well dressed.178

Such deception was often quite deliberate. "To almost everything at Round Lake", one teacher admitted, "there are two sides, the side that goes in the report and that inspectors see, and the side that exists from day to day."179 This phenomenon was widespread. It was common practice that when an official wanted to add weight to a school report, he introduced it with the remark, "There was no preparation made for my visit as I was quite unexpected."180 When it was known the official was coming, the children could be and were cowed into answering questions about their care in the way school administrators wanted.181

Despite the duplicity, reports in departmental files from school staff, local agents and inspectors establish that the system did not guarantee that all children were always properly fed and clothed. Hunger was a permanent reality: the food was often "too meagre";182 the fare was not appropriate "neither as to quantity or quality";183 the children "were not given enough to eat especially meat";184 the food supply was inadequate "for the needs of the children"; the "vitality of the children is not sufficiently sustained from a lack of nutritious food, or enough of the same for vigorous growing children."185

The same files carry images of the children that disrupt Hamilton's picture of Sunday downtown dress at Birtle school: "I have never seen such patched and ragged clothing",186 their "uniform is so old and so worn out that we do not dare show them to anyone";187 the children "are not being treated at all good, nothing on their feet, etc.";188 the children were "dirty and their clothes were disgraceful";189 and "I never had in my school a dirtier, more ill-clad or more likeable class of little folk". The children had the most ridiculous outfits. The little girls go teetering around in pumps with outlandish heels, sizes too large, or silly little sandals that wont stay on their feet — cheap lots that he [the principal] buys for next to nothing, or second hand misfits that come in bales.190

Those "second hand misfits that come in bales" signify that in these areas of care, the lack of funding by the government and the churches was yet again a major determinant in the treatment of the children. Whenever per capita rates were reduced or seen to be too low, someone was bound to point out that it would "render almost superhuman the task of
feeding, clothing and treating the children in the manner required by the department." It was often "utterly impossible" to do that "from the present per capita grant", and thus principals took the tack of "economizing to the bone in every possible department." In 1937, Hoey conceded that throughout the history of the system there had never been any connection between "our payments and the cost of feeding and clothing pupils from year to year" and that principals had been left on their own to deal with "the actual costs of operation."

While the resultant 'economizing' may have meant no more than charity clothes in some cases, in terms of food, the consequences were more drastic and damaging to the education and health of the children. To keep costs down, administrators strove to produce food and income from the school farm or orchard — an undertaking in which the children, in Scott's description of Qu'Appelle, were "simply used as so much manpower to produce revenue." As his comment suggests, the department was fully aware of the situation and, indeed, of the way it undercut the education program, in some instances, as at Birtle, turning it on its head. Hamilton commented, after visiting the school, that "The farm should be operated for the school — not the school for the farm." Agent W. Graham's 1916 review of school records at Qu'Appelle found that, owing to work, the boys were in class so infrequently that "the main idea and object of the school is being entirely neglected" and that the school had become a "workhouse". This practice continued until 1951 when the half-day system was abandoned. At Morley school in Saskatchewan the inspector reported that, to the detriment of their education, the principal threw "a large burden of the institutional drudgery on to the children."

Underfunding, short rations and overwork contributed, doctors and agents across the system reported, to the children's ill-health, and some doctors even alerted the department to a connection they observed between malnutrition and tuberculosis. Furthermore, the range and quality of food the children did receive was affected by efforts to economize. It was a widespread practice "to sell most of the milk and eggs...in order to augment maintenance funds". Inspector R.H. Cairns was so disturbed by this practice in the British Columbia schools, and in particular by milk skimming to collect cream for sale, that he declared, "if I had my way I would banish every separator....The pupils need the butter fat so much." By many departmental accounts, the variety of food served was limited; "decidedly monotonous" was the way Benson described the "regulation school meal" in 1897 — "bread and drippings or boiled beef and potatoes". In fact, there appears to have been a persistent shortage of meat and fish which, unlike grains and vegetables, were difficult to secure in bulk and to store. Ironically, children entering a school likely left behind a better diet, provided by communities still living on the land, than what was provided by the churches and the department.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to assess the nutritional value of school diets before 1946. In that year, however, the nutrition division of the department of national health and welfare surveyed the food services at eight schools. Though the department characterized the results as "fairly satisfactory", the report itself did not support such a conclusion but
rather confirmed the impressions given by the files throughout the history of the system. The dietitians found that "mediocre" salaries secured kitchen staff who were "unqualified", carried out their "work in a careless and uninterested fashion" and thus "the food quality was not good". Poor menu planning that failed to recognize the nutritional value of certain foods, equipment that was "unfit", "antiquated cooking facilities", and bad cooking practices contributed to the "nutritional inadequacy of the children's diet", which lacked sufficient amounts of vitamins A, B and C. The children received too little meat and not enough green vegetables, whole grains, fruit, juices, milk, iodized salt and eggs.

The dietitians laid much of the blame for the conditions they described on "financial limitations" — the same limitations that plagued every other aspect of the system and always led in the end to neglect of the children. With the benefit of hindsight, Davey's 1968 review of the system up to 1950 acknowledged that fact. Neither the churches nor the department, he charged, appeared to have had any real understanding of the needs of the children. The method of financing these institutions by per capita grants was an iniquitous system which made no provision for the establishment and maintenance of standards, even in such basic elements as staffing, food and clothing.

All that was to have changed in 1957, when the department brought an end to the per capita system and placed the schools on a "controlled cost basis" intended to achieve "greater efficiency in their operation" as well as to assure proper "standards of food, clothing and supervision at all schools." This system was formalized by new contracts with the churches signed in 1961. The government was prepared to "reimburse each school for actual expenditures within certain limitations." Those limitations were translated into allowances — maximum rates set for teachers' salaries, transportation, extra-curricular activities, rental costs, building repairs and maintenance, and capital costs.

In terms of standards of care, the department strove to bring the budgeting process more into line with the children's needs and regional cost differentials. In particular, with food and clothing, it attempted "to make special provision for the requirements of older children." Thus in calculating the allowances for food and clothes, the children were divided into two groups, those in grade 6 and lower grades and those in grade 7 or higher grades, with appropriate rates assigned to each. In addition, as early as 1953, the department began to issue directives to the schools on issues of care, and more detailed reporting procedures by principals were developed.

None of this was enough, however, to prevent a continuation of problems still endemic in the system. The post-1957 record of the controlled cost system was not an improvement over the previous decades. There was in fact an underlying contradiction between the intention to close down the system and that of keeping the schools in peak physical condition. Davey himself signalled this in recommending that "expenditures should be limited to emergency repairs which are basic to the health and safety of the children" in cases "where closure is anticipated, due to integration". Budgeting favoured integration, which was at the centre of the department's education strategy. In a detailed brief to the
department in 1968, the national association of principals and administrators of Indian residences pointed out that in the allocation of funds, the integration program received a much greater proportion, resulting in a situation where "our Federal schools are sadly neglected when compared with the Provincial schools." Indeed, a report commissioned by the department established in 1967 that the funding level was still very "low in comparison with most progressive institutional programs" in the United States and in the provincial sector.

The principals' association went on to detail the effects of underfunding in a school-by-school survey that echoed the Paget report — a long system-wide catalogue of deferred maintenance, hazardous fire conditions, inadequate wiring, heating and plumbing, and much needed capital construction to replace structures that were "totally unsuitable and a disgrace to Indian affairs". Even schools built since the war to serve communities in areas outside the scope of integration gave evidence of faulty construction and inadequate recreation, residence and classroom space. In conclusion, the association tried to impress upon the department the seriousness of the situation. It was not prepared to accept the "old cliche: lack of funds". That was "not an excuse, nor an explanation for we know that funds do exist."

In a memo from Davey forwarded to the deputy minister along with the association's brief, he admitted that,

Although I can take exception to some of the examples given in the brief, the fact remains that we are not meeting requirements as we should nor have we provided the facilities which are required for the appropriate functioning of a residential school system.

It was impossible to do so, for there were simply "too many of these units" and the department was too heavily committed in other areas of higher priority — in community development, integration and welfare expenditures. Nor did he think it was wise to devote effort to achieving increased appropriations for, with "the best interests of the Indian children" in mind, it was more sensible to close the system down.

The deputy minister, J.A. Macdonald, followed this line in his reply to the principals. There was no attempt to refute their characterization of the condition of the system. The department had failed, he conceded, to carry out "necessary repairs and renovations and capital projects". This had been "simply due to financial limitations", which he was sure, taking refuge in the "old cliche", would not improve in the future. In the final analysis, however, the funds were inadequate and, as the association asserted, it was always the children who were "the first to feel the pinch of departmental economy".

Schools that were part of the northern affairs system after 1955 had their own doleful history and were not above the sort of critique made by the principals' association. A harsh review of the operation of Fort Providence school concluded with the remark, "I would sooner have a child of mine in a reform school than in this dreadful institution." As in the south, the system did not ensure that adequate food and clothing and safe and
healthy conditions were provided for all the children all the time. There was always, as at the Tent Hostel at Coppermine, for example, some considerable distance between intention and reality. One of the teachers there submitted a remarkable report on a hostel term during which the staff and Inuit children had had a "satisfactory and happy experience", despite the fact that their accommodations were "very cold because all the heat escaped through the chimneys, there was a constant fire hazard", the children's clothes were "unsatisfactory", and the children received a most non-traditional diet of corn beef and cabbage at most dinners, while the staff ate their "monthly fresh food supply" at the same table, so as to give "the youngsters an opportunity to model their table manners from those of the staff". A consulting psychologist, after a visit to the Churchill Vocational Centre, which was housed in an army barracks, commented that "I know what a rat must feel when it is placed in a maze." When he moved on to two schools in the Keewatin area, he found the buildings equally unsuitable.

The history of Indian affairs' post-1957 determination to ensure high standards of care was no brighter than its record of repair and maintenance. At the end of the very first year of the operation of the controlled cost system, the department, on the advice of the churches and the nutrition division of the federal health department, had to raise rates, adjust the grade divisions and introduce a supplementary allowance to recognize additional costs for schools "where climatic conditions necessitate special clothing." Such fine tuning became a permanent feature of the 1957 system. It was, unfortunately, always fruitless, for the funds provided by the department to feed and clothe the children continually lagged behind increases in cost, and thus the sorrowful consequences for the children went unrelieved.

There was no improvement after 1969, when the government and the churches parted ways and the department took direct control of the system. A subsequent survey in the Saskatchewan region revealed that allowances were not adequate to provide proper clothes, especially for children in hostels who were attending provincial schools, or food or recreational activities. One administrator reported that he had to serve "more often than we should food such as hot dogs, bologna, garlic sausages, macaroni etc....the cheapest food on the market and still I can hardly make it." Most of the others in the survey — and by implication most administrators and, therefore, most children in the system — were having the same experience.

As in the case of tuberculosis, failure to provide adequate nutrition was rooted not only in the iniquitous per capitas and chronic underfunding, but in the fact that departmental regulations intended to guarantee good care were administrative fictions. From the beginning of the system, and subsequently in the order in council of 1892 and the 1911 contracts, the department stipulated that to receive funds schools had to be "kept up to a certain dietary [standard]" — a regulated scale of rations outlining the foodstuffs and the amounts children were to receive weekly. This engendered considerable controversy between the department and the churches over the adequacy of the scale, how realistic it was given the level of grants, and the degree to which the principals adhered to it. In fact, the 'dietary' was largely ignored by everyone, including the department which did not, according to Benson, inspect the schools on any regular basis. Benson even
repudiated the scale, explaining in 1904 that "it is not now and was never enforced" and that it was only ever a "guide...to arrive at the cost of feeding pupils." Thereafter, any pretence that there was actually an enforceable regulation was abandoned and, in 1922, the churches and principals were given responsibility for drawing up their own meal plans, which the department was willing to submit to the "Health Department in Ottawa for their criticism."

In subsequent decades, the department's relationship with nutrition services at the department of health remained purely consultative, with consultations being so irregular that the service told Indian affairs in 1954 that they had "almost lost touch with most of the residential schools due to the lack of requests for our services." After 1957, the inspection service expanded, inspections became more regular, and food allowances were "established to provide a standard equivalent to the diet recommended by Canada's Food Rules".

What did not change however, was the department's lax manner of responding to recommendations in inspection reports. Like the dietary standards of the earlier part of the century, they were not enforced but routinely passed along to principals with no more than a suggestion that everything be done "that can be done to live up to the recommendations of the dietician." Problems were thrown back into the laps of principals, who were to "see what can be done about them in a constructive way." Despite the department's regulatory authority, which tied grants to the maintenance of standards, there was no stern intervention on behalf of the children, so that even the most egregious neglect by church authorities and principals could drag on unresolved for years. In light of such careless management, what Hamilton wrote of Elkhorn school in 1944 might stand as the motto of the system: "It is not being operated, it is just running."

In reviewing the long administrative and financial history of the system — the way the vision of residential education was made real — there can be no dispute: the churches and the government did not, in any thoughtful fashion, care for the children they presumed to parent. While this is traceable to systemic problems, particularly the lack of financial resources, the persistence of those problems and the unrelieved neglect of the children can be explained only in the context of another deficit — the lack of moral resources, the abrogation of parental responsibility. The avalanche of reports on the condition of children — hungry, malnourished, ill-clothed, dying of tuberculosis, overworked — failed to move either the churches or successive governments past the point of intention and on to concerted and effective remedial action.

Neglect was routinely ignored, and without remedial action, it became a thoughtless habit. It was, however, only one part of a larger pattern of church and government irresponsibility writ more starkly in the harsh discipline, cruelty and abuse of generations of children taken into the schools. Here, too, the record is clear. When senior officials in the department and the churches became aware of cases of abuse, they failed routinely to come to the rescue of children they had removed from their real parents or, as they
claimed ironically in the case of Category 3, children they had rescued from situations of neglect in communities.


In any evaluation of the residential school record throughout its long history, a persistent reality appears amidst shifting vision and policies. Not only did the system fail to transport Aboriginal children through the classroom to the desired assimilative destination — or even, as Davey's 1968 record witnessed, to provide adequate levels of education — it failed to cherish them. In the building, funding and management of those purported "circles of civilized conditions", it failed to make of those schools homes where children would always be well-clothed and fed, safely housed and kindly treated. Even in the post-war period, administrative and financial reforms adopted in the midst of the general reorganization of Aboriginal education could not retrieve the situation and did not reverse the chronic neglect of the system, which forced children to live in conditions and endure levels of care that fell short of acceptable standards.

The persistently woeful condition of the school system and the too often substandard care of the children were rooted in a number of factors: in the government's and churches' unrelieved underfunding of the system, in the method of financing individual schools, in the failure of the department to exercise adequate oversight and control of the schools, and in the failure of the department and the churches to ensure proper treatment of the children by staff. Those conditions constituted the context for the neglect, abuse and death of an incalculable number of children and for immeasurable damage to Aboriginal communities.

This is not the story of an aging nineteenth century structure falling into decay but of flaws, inherent in the creation and subsequent management of the system, that were never remedied. From Confederation, with two schools in operation, the system grew at the rate of some two schools a year, so that by 1904 there were 64 schools. Such growth was not the product of forethought, of a developmental strategy controlled by the government or by the department of Indian affairs. Rather it was the product of federal reactions to the force of missionary efforts across the country and the considerable force of the churches' political influence in Ottawa by which they secured funds to operate the schools. No better summary of the process of building the system can be given than that contained in a departmental briefing to the minister, Charles Stewart, in 1927: "It thus happens that Churches have been pioneers in the remote parts of the country, and with missionary funds have put up buildings and induced the department to provide funds for maintenance."

Though its senior officials were themselves dedicated to the concept of residential education, the department was in a sense driven before a whirlwind of missionary activity. No matter which way it turned — in the west, the north and into British Columbia — as it moved to implement Davin's industrial school design, the department found schools already constructed and holding classes for children. By 1907 — with 77 schools on the books, the great majority of them established by the churches, and with no
sign of the flood of new schools or church petitions for support waning — the senior clerk in the education section, Martin Benson, proclaimed, with evident exasperation, "The clergy seem to be going wild on the subject of Indian education and it is time some limit should be fixed as to their demands."  

Indeed, the department had already tried, unsuccessfully, to bring the system, especially its rapidly rising costs, under control. By order in council in 1892, the department introduced what Vankoughnet termed a "correct principle" — a per capita grant arrangement that remained in force until 1957. This principle was attractive because, in theory at least, it would enable the department to "know exactly where we stand", limiting the federal contribution to the schools to a fixed annual figure tied to enrolments.

This attempt by the department to "relieve the pressure of present expenditure" and to institute "economical management" on the part of the churches, to quote the order in council, was a total failure. In limiting the liability of the department, the per capita system automatically threw an increased financial burden onto the shoulders of the churches. In the case of schools where the per capita grant did not meet a large enough part of the operating costs, which were impossible to standardize owing to the differing circumstances of schools — location, access to supplies, the availability of students — or where school management continued to be faulty, churches soon claimed that their funds were oversubscribed. They returned to Ottawa, cap in hand, for additional funding and yearly made demands for increases in per capita rates. By 1904, the collective deficit was $50,000 and rising, and the auditor general demanded yet tighter control — "A rigid inspection of financial affairs should be made on behalf of the government at least once a year."

The auditor general was not alone in pushing for reform. In 1906 the Protestant churches submitted their Winnipeg Resolutions, drawn up at a conference on education. These reiterated demands they had been making each year for increased per capitas, upgrading of schools at government expense, and increased allocations for teachers' salaries. The resolutions and the deputy superintendent general's admission that the financial ills of the system lay in underfunding rather than, as the department charged constantly, in the inefficient and extravagant hands of church appointed principals, brought on the second attempt to bring order to the system. This took the form of contracts between the government and the churches, signed in 1911, in which, the minister promised, the whole conduct and management of these schools would be covered...the responsibilities of each toward the other would be definitely fixed and the financial straits in which the churches found themselves...would in a measure be relieved by the Government.

The minister was as good as his word — in part. New, higher per capita rates, recognizing regional cost differences, were adopted, and the contracts dealt with the obligations of the churches and the government, establishing the department as senior partner in the joint management of the schools. It had primary responsibility for setting
standards of care and education, including the appointment and dismissal of teachers, and it reserved the right to cancel the contract pertaining to any school not being operated according to the regulations it formulated. To that end, the churches had to hold the schools ready for inspection by the department.142

The contracts were meant to mark a new beginning for the system, laying the basis for "improved relations" between the department and the churches that were in turn to result "in benefit to the physical condition and intellectual advancement of the Indian children."143 Such hopeful predictions were not, however, the substance of effective reform. The system soon fell back into funding and management difficulties. The contracts were to be reviewed and renewed at the end of five years, but they never were and without any legal agreement to bind the parties, they drifted back into the previous "unbusinesslike lack of arrangement"144 and into discord over operation of the system.

On the financial front, government intentions were overborne by a long string of excuses for continued underfunding. The First World War and then the Depression prevented significant increases or clawed back, in whole or part, those the department was able to allocate.145 While the Second World War pulled the country out of the Depression, it also meant cuts "to almost every appropriation"146 and made the department realize that "it would be exceedingly difficult to secure the funds necessary...at any time during the years that lie ahead of us."147

As a result, there were never enough funds in the pre-Second World War era to satisfy the appetite of the churches or to prevent them from again encountering substantial deficits.148 While the department publicly contested the churches' assertion of how desperate the financial situation was, privately it had its own figures that demonstrated dramatically that the per capita, pegged at $180 in 1938, was "exceptionably low" and inadequate for the needs of the children, particularly in relation to the funding of other residential care facilities. Hoey informed the deputy superintendent general, H. McGill, that the province of Manitoba provided grants of $642 and $550 per capita respectively to the School for the Deaf and the School for Boys. Private institutions in the province were also funded more generously. The Knowles School for Boys received $362 for each boy from the Community Chest, and the Catholic church provided St. Norbert's Orphanage with $294 per capita. The residential schools fared no better in comparison with funding for similar institutions in the United States, where the Child Welfare League of America estimated that the average per capita grant of large child care institutions was $541, with smaller ones running only as low as $313.149

The cumulative weight of underfunding of the system throughout this period, which pressed down on the balance books of the churches and the department and drove individual schools into debt, was nothing compared to its consequences for the schools and their students. Badly built, poorly maintained and overcrowded, the schools' deplorable conditions were a dreadful weight that pressed down on the thousands of children who attended them. For many of those children it proved to be a mortal weight. Scott, reviewing the history of the system for the new minister, Arthur Meighen, in 1918,
noted that the buildings were "undoubtedly chargeable with a very high death rate among
the pupils."150

When the churches and the department signed the 1911 contracts, it was clear to all the
partners that there was a crisis in the conditions and sanitation of the schools and,
therefore, in the health of the children. They could not have failed to know it for they had
at hand two reports, one by the department’s chief medical officer, Dr. P.H. Bryce,
outlining in a most sensational manner the tragic impact of tuberculosis on the children,
and another by a departmental accountant, F.H. Paget, who had been detailed to survey
the condition of the schools in the west.

Throughout the initial stages of the unrestrained building of the system, the department
had been, Duncan Campbell Scott admitted, “intensely apprehensive” about the quality
and safety of the schools, which the churches routinely "erected on very primitive
plans".151 According to an assessment of the system by Martin Benson in 1897, the
department's own record was not a great deal better. Many of the buildings it was
responsible for constructing, in association with the department of public works, had
"been put up without due regard for the purpose for which they would be required,
hurriedly constructed of poor materials, badly laid out without due provision for lighting,
heating or ventilating."152 The department had, in fact, insisted in the north-west on the
"simplest and cheapest construction."153

Paget’s 1908 report revealed the legacy of such a policy. The majority of the 21 schools
he inspected were, like St. Paul’s boarding school near Cardston, Alberta, "quite unfit for
the purpose it is being used", with faulty heating, drainage and ventilation. The schools
were "not modern in any respect." Moreover, his comments drew out what had become a
tragic commonplace in the department — the connection between the condition of the
buildings and disease, particularly the scourge of tuberculosis.154 From early in the history
of the system, alarming health reports had come into the department from local officials
and doctors tracing out a pattern of interwoven factors contributing to "the present very
high death rate from this disease": overcrowding, lack of care and cleanliness and poor
sanitation.155

Overcrowding, the most critical dynamic in the spread of tuberculosis, was systemic,156 a
predictable outcome of underfunding and of the per capita grant arrangement that put a
premium on each student taken from a community. Senior church officials lobbied the
government constantly not only for higher rates but for implementation of a compulsory
education regime that would ensure that the schools earned the maximum grant
possible.157 For their part, the principals, unable to make ends meet, as rates were rarely
increased to the level of real costs, pushed to have their authorized enrolments raised. The
pressure to keep schools full meant there was a tendency to take as many children as
possible, often going past wise limits, with disastrous consequences.158 This led to bizarre
recruitment techniques, including, local officials reported, "bribing and kidnapping".159 As
well, officials were not very careful about the health of the children they brought into the
schools. The Anglican Bishop of Caledonia in British Columbia admitted candidly, “The
per capita grant system encourages the taking in of those physically and intellectually unfit simply to keep up numbers".160

The impact of Bryce's report, submitted in 1907, which in part only repeated what was already in departmental files, stemmed from his statistical profile of the extent of tuberculosis among children in western schools. It became the stuff of headlines and critical editorial comment. Saturday Night concluded that "even war seldom shows as large a percentage of fatalities as does the education system we have imposed upon our Indian wards."161 The percentage was indeed shocking. Bryce's death toll for the 1,537 children in his survey of 15 schools was 24 per cent, and this figure might have risen to 42 per cent if the children had been tracked for three years after they returned to their reserves.162 The rate varied from school to school going as high as 47 per cent at Old Sun's on the Blackfoot reserve. Kuper Island school in British Columbia, which was not included in Bryce's sample, had a rate of 40 per cent over its 25-year history.163 While a few officials and churchmen rejected Bryce's findings and attacked him as a "medical faddist",164 most had to agree with him,165 and no less an authority than Scott asserted that, system-wide, "fifty per cent of the children who passed through these schools did not live to benefit from the education which they had received therein."166

Not only was this, in the words of Saturday Night, "a situation disgraceful to the country",167 but in the opinion of S.H. Blake, qc, who assisted in negotiations for the 1911 contracts, because the department had done nothing over the decades "to obviate the preventable causes of death, [it] brings itself within unpleasant nearness to the charge of manslaughter."168 The churches too bore responsibility for what Bryce characterized, in a pamphlet published in 1922, as a "national crime",169 but the department had a special responsibility. In the order in council of 1892 and in the 1911 contracts, it had taken to itself the authority to set standards and had instituted a regulation requiring that prospective students receive a health certificate signed by a doctor. This check, which would supposedly prevent tubercular children being taken into the schools, was — like so many other regulations relating to care of the children, such as those regarding clothes, food and discipline — implemented carelessly by the department and ignored by many school and departmental officials. Such laxity even continued, Scott admitted, in the decades after Bryce's report.170

Indeed, in those decades, almost nothing was done about tuberculosis in the schools, so that Bryce's charge that "this trail of disease and death has gone on almost unchecked by any serious efforts on the part of the Department of Indian Affairs",171 was sorrowfully correct. The department did not even launch a full investigation of the system. Again the explanation for this persistent carelessness was, in part, the government's refusal to fund the schools adequately to carry out a program of renovations to improve health conditions, which senior officials themselves proposed, or to undertake special measures, recommended by health authorities, to intervene in the case of sick children.172 In a number of instances it did implement, because it was relatively cheap, a radical course of action — mass surgery, performed on school tables, to remove teeth, tonsils and adenoids, believed to be the frequent seats of infection.173 Not surprisingly, conditions did not improve; schools in 1940 were still not being maintained "in a reasonable state".
and the few reports extant on the health of the children, which are scattered and sketchy (for the department never set up a procedure to monitor health) point to the continuation of alarmingly high rates of infection.\textsuperscript{175}

The dramatic tuberculosis story, which chronicles what Bryce suggested was the government's "criminal disregard" for the "welfare of the Indian wards of the nation",\textsuperscript{176} cannot be allowed to distract attention from the fact that the care of the children in almost every other area was also tragically substandard. Throughout the history of the system many children were, as the principal of St. George's testified in 1922, "ill-fed and ill-clothed and turned out into the cold to work", trapped and "unhappy with a feeling of slavery existing in their minds" and with no escape but in "thought".\textsuperscript{177}

It is difficult to assess how widespread neglect was in the area of food and clothing, for again the department had no reporting procedure, and there is evidence of a fair deal of duplicity on the part of the churches, or individual principals, anxious to make the most favourable impression. A comment in 1936 by A. Hamilton, a local departmental official, on the children at Birtle school, just outside Birtle, Manitoba, symbolizes the situation.

In fairness I want to add that all the children have good clothes but these are kept for Sundays and when the children go downtown — in other words when out where they can be seen, they are well dressed.\textsuperscript{178}

Such deception was often quite deliberate. "To almost everything at Round Lake", one teacher admitted, "there are two sides, the side that goes in the report and that inspectors see, and the side that exists from day to day."\textsuperscript{179} This phenomenon was widespread. It was common practice that when an official wanted to add weight to a school report, he introduced it with the remark, "There was no preparation made for my visit as I was quite unexpected."\textsuperscript{180} When it was known the official was coming, the children could be and were cowed into answering questions about their care in the way school administrators wanted.\textsuperscript{181}

Despite the duplicity, reports in departmental files from school staff, local agents and inspectors establish that the system did not guarantee that all children were always properly fed and clothed. Hunger was a permanent reality: the food was often "too meagre";\textsuperscript{182} the fare was not appropriate "neither as to quantity or quality";\textsuperscript{183} the children "were not given enough to eat especially meat";\textsuperscript{184} the food supply was inadequate "for the needs of the children"; the "vitality of the children is not sufficiently sustained from a lack of nutritious food, or enough of the same for vigorous growing children."\textsuperscript{185}

The same files carry images of the children that disrupt Hamilton's picture of Sunday downtown dress at Birtle school: "I have never seen such patched and ragged clothing";\textsuperscript{186} their "uniform is so old and so worn out that we do not dare show them to anyone";\textsuperscript{187} the children "are not being treated at all good, nothing on their feet, etc.";\textsuperscript{188} the children were "dirty and their clothes were disgraceful";\textsuperscript{189} and "I never had in my school a dirtier, more ill-clad or more likeable class of little folk". The children had the most ridiculous outfits. The little girls go teetering around in pumps with outlandish heels, sizes too large, or silly
little sandals that won't stay on their feet — cheap lots that he [the principal] buys for next
to nothing, or second hand misfits that come in bales.\textsuperscript{190}

Those "second hand misfits that come in bales" signify that in these areas of care, the lack
of funding by the government and the churches was yet again a major determinant in the
treatment of the children. Whenever per capita rates were reduced or seen to be too low,
someone was bound to point out that it would "render almost superhuman the task of
feeding, clothing and treating the children in the manner required by the department."\textsuperscript{191} It
was often "utterly impossible" to do that "from the present per capita grant",\textsuperscript{192} and thus
principals took the taff of "economizing to the bone in every possible department."\textsuperscript{193} In
1937, Hoey conceded that throughout the history of the system there had never been any
connection between "our payments and the cost of feeding and clothing pupils from year
to year" and that principals had been left on their own to deal with "the actual costs of
operation."\textsuperscript{194}

While the resultant 'economizing' may have meant no more than charity clothes in some
cases, in terms of food, the consequences were more drastic and damaging to the
education and health of the children. To keep costs down, administrators strove to
produce food and income from the school farm or orchard — an undertaking in which the
children, in Scott's description of Qu'Appelle, were "simply used as so much manpower
to produce revenue."\textsuperscript{195} As his comment suggests, the department was fully aware of the
situation and, indeed, of the way it undercut the education program, in some instances, as
at Birtle, turning it on its head. Hamilton commented, after visiting the school, that "The
farm should be operated for the school — not the school for the farm."\textsuperscript{196} Agent W.
Graham's 1916 review of school records at Qu'Appelle found that, owing to work, the
boys were in class so infrequently that "the main idea and object of the school is being
entirely neglected" and that the school had become a "workhouse".\textsuperscript{197} This practice
continued until 1951 when the half-day system was abandoned. At Morley school in
Saskatchewan the inspector reported that, to the detriment of their education, the
principal threw "a large burden of the institutional drudgery on to the children."\textsuperscript{198}

Underfunding, short rations and overwork contributed, doctors and agents across the
system reported, to the children's ill-health, and some doctors even alerted the department
to a connection they observed between malnutrition and tuberculosis.\textsuperscript{199} Furthermore, the
range and quality of food the children did receive was affected by efforts to economize. It
was a widespread practice "to sell most of the milk and eggs...in order to augment
maintenance funds".\textsuperscript{200} Inspector R.H. Cairns was so disturbed by this practice in the
British Columbia schools, and in particular by milk skimming to collect cream for sale,
that he declared, "if I had my way I would banish every separator....The pupils need the
butter fat so much."\textsuperscript{201}

By many departmental accounts, the variety of food served was limited; "decidedly
monotonous" was the way Benson described the "regulation school meal" in 1897 —
"bread and drippings or boiled beef and potatoes".\textsuperscript{202} In fact, there appears to have been a
persistent shortage of meat and fish which, unlike grains and vegetables, were difficult to
secure in bulk and to store.\textsuperscript{203} Ironically, children entering a school likely left behind a
better diet, provided by communities still living on the land, than what was provided by
the churches and the department.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to assess the nutritional value of school diets before 1946.
In that year, however, the nutrition division of the department of national health and
welfare surveyed the food services at eight schools. Though the department characterized
the results as "fairly satisfactory", the report itself did not support such a conclusion but
rather confirmed the impressions given by the files throughout the history of the system.
The dietitians found that "mediocre" salaries secured kitchen staff who were
"unqualified", carried out their "work in a careless and uninterested fashion" and thus
"the food quality was not good". Poor menu planning that failed to recognize the
nutritional value of certain foods, equipment that was "unfit", "antiquated cooking
facilities", and bad cooking practices contributed to the "nutritional inadequacy of the
children's diet", which lacked sufficient amounts of vitamins A, B and C. The children
received too little meat and not enough green vegetables, whole grains, fruit, juices, milk,
iodized salt and eggs.204

The dietitians laid much of the blame for the conditions they described on "financial
limitations" — the same limitations that plagued every other aspect of the system and
always led in the end to neglect of the children. With the benefit of hindsight, Davey's
1968 review of the system up to 1950 acknowledged that fact. Neither the churches nor
the department, he charged, appeared to have had any real understanding of the needs of
the children....The method of financing these institutions by per capita grants was an
iniquitous system which made no provision for the establishment and maintenance of
standards, even in such basic elements as staffing, food and clothing.205

All that was to have changed in 1957, when the department brought an end to the per
capita system and placed the schools on a "controlled cost basis" intended to achieve
"greater efficiency in their operation" as well as to assure proper "standards of food,
clothing and supervision at all schools." This system was formalized by new contracts
with the churches signed in 1961. The government was prepared to "reimburse each
school for actual expenditures within certain limitations."206 Those limitations were
translated into allowances — maximum rates set for teachers' salaries, transportation,
extra-curricular activities, rental costs, building repairs and maintenance, and capital
costs.

In terms of standards of care, the department strove to bring the budgeting process more
into line with the children's needs and regional cost differentials. In particular, with food
and clothing, it attempted "to make special provision for the requirements of older
children." Thus in calculating the allowances for food and clothes, the children were
divided into two groups, those in grade 6 and lower grades and those in grade 7 or higher
grades, with appropriate rates assigned to each.207 In addition, as early as 1953, the
department began to issue directives to the schools on issues of care, and more detailed
reporting procedures by principals were developed.
None of this was enough, however, to prevent a continuation of problems still endemic in the system. The post-1957 record of the controlled cost system was not an improvement over the previous decades. There was in fact an underlying contradiction between the intention to close down the system and that of keeping the schools in peak physical condition. Davey himself signalled this in recommending that "expenditures should be limited to emergency repairs which are basic to the health and safety of the children" in cases "where closure is anticipated, due to integration".[208] Budgeting favoured integration, which was at the centre of the department's education strategy. In a detailed brief to the department in 1968, the national association of principals and administrators of Indian residences pointed out that in the allocation of funds, the integration program received a much greater proportion, resulting in a situation where "our Federal schools are sadly neglected when compared with the Provincial schools."[209] Indeed, a report commissioned by the department established in 1967 that the funding level was still very "low in comparison with most progressive institutional programs" in the United States and in the provincial sector.[210]

The principals' association went on to detail the effects of underfunding in a school-by-school survey that echoed the Paget report — a long system-wide catalogue of deferred maintenance, hazardous fire conditions, inadequate wiring, heating and plumbing, and much needed capital construction to replace structures that were "totally unsuitable and a disgrace to Indian affairs". Even schools built since the war to serve communities in areas outside the scope of integration gave evidence of faulty construction and inadequate recreation, residence and classroom space. In conclusion, the association tried to impress upon the department the seriousness of the situation. It was not prepared to accept the "old cliche: lack of funds". That was "not an excuse, nor an explanation for we know that funds do exist."[211]

In a memo from Davey forwarded to the deputy minister along with the association's brief, he admitted that,

Although I can take exception to some of the examples given in the brief, the fact remains that we are not meeting requirements as we should nor have we provided the facilities which are required for the appropriate functioning of a residential school system.[212]

It was impossible to do so, for there were simply "too many of these units" and the department was too heavily committed in other areas of higher priority — in community development, integration and welfare expenditures. Nor did he think it was wise to devote effort to achieving increased appropriations for, with "the best interests of the Indian children" in mind, it was more sensible to close the system down.[213]

The deputy minister, J.A. Macdonald, followed this line in his reply to the principals. There was no attempt to refute their characterization of the condition of the system. The department had failed, he conceded, to carry out "necessary repairs and renovations and capital projects". This had been "simply due to financial limitations", which he was sure, taking refuge in the "old cliche", would not improve in the future.[214] In the final analysis,
however, the funds were inadequate and, as the association asserted, it was always the children who were "the first to feel the pinch of departmental economy".  

Schools that were part of the northern affairs system after 1955 had their own doleful history and were not above the sort of critique made by the principals' association. A harsh review of the operation of Fort Providence school concluded with the remark, "I would sooner have a child of mine in a reform school than in this dreadful institution." As in the south, the system did not ensure that adequate food and clothing and safe and healthy conditions were provided for all the children all the time. There was always, as at the Tent Hostel at Coppermine, for example, some considerable distance between intention and reality. One of the teachers there submitted a remarkable report on a hostel term during which the staff and Inuit children had had a "satisfactory and happy experience", despite the fact that their accommodations were "very cold because all the heat escaped through the chimneys, there was a constant fire hazard", the children's clothes were "unsatisfactory", and the children received a most non-traditional diet of corn beef and cabbage at most dinners, while the staff ate their "monthly fresh food supply" at the same table, so as to give "the youngsters an opportunity to model their table manners from those of the staff". A consulting psychologist, after a visit to the Churchill Vocational Centre, which was housed in an army barracks, commented that "I know what a rat must feel when it is placed in a maze." When he moved on to two schools in the Keewatin area, he found the buildings equally unsuitable.

The history of Indian affairs' post-1957 determination to ensure high standards of care was no brighter than its record of repair and maintenance. At the end of the very first year of the operation of the controlled cost system, the department, on the advice of the churches and the nutrition division of the federal health department, had to raise rates, adjust the grade divisions and introduce a supplementary allowance to recognize additional costs for schools "where climatic conditions necessitate special clothing." Such fine tuning became a permanent feature of the 1957 system. It was, unfortunately, always fruitless, for the funds provided by the department to feed and clothe the children continually lagged behind increases in cost, and thus the sorrowful consequences for the children went unrelieved.

There was no improvement after 1969, when the government and the churches parted ways and the department took direct control of the system. A subsequent survey in the Saskatchewan region revealed that allowances were not adequate to provide proper clothes, especially for children in hostels who were attending provincial schools, or food or recreational activities. One administrator reported that he had to serve "more often than we should food such as hot dogs, bologna, garlic sausages, macaroni etc....the cheapest food on the market and still I can hardly make it." Most of the others in the survey — and by implication most administrators and, therefore, most children in the system — were having the same experience.

As in the case of tuberculosis, failure to provide adequate nutrition was rooted not only in the iniquitous per capitas and chronic underfunding, but in the fact that departmental regulations intended to guarantee good care were administrative fictions. From the
beginning of the system, and subsequently in the order in council of 1892 and the 1911 contracts, the department stipulated that to receive funds schools had to be "kept up to a certain dietary [standard]" — a regulated scale of rations outlining the foodstuffs and the amounts children were to receive weekly. This engendered considerable controversy between the department and the churches over the adequacy of the scale, how realistic it was given the level of grants, and the degree to which the principals adhered to it. In fact, the 'dietary' was largely ignored by everyone, including the department which did not, according to Benson, inspect the schools on any regular basis. Benson even repudiated the scale, explaining in 1904 that "it is not now and was never enforced" and that it was only ever a "guide...to arrive at the cost of feeding pupils." Thereafter, any pretence that there was actually an enforceable regulation was abandoned and, in 1922, the churches and principals were given responsibility for drawing up their own meal plans, which the department was willing to submit to the "Health Department in Ottawa for their criticism."

In subsequent decades, the department's relationship with nutrition services at the department of health remained purely consultative, with consultations being so irregular that the service told Indian affairs in 1954 that they had "almost lost touch with most of the residential schools due to the lack of requests for our services." After 1957, the inspection service expanded, inspections became more regular, and food allowances were "established to provide a standard equivalent to the diet recommended by Canada's Food Rules".

What did not change however, was the department's lax manner of responding to recommendations in inspection reports. Like the dietary standards of the earlier part of the century, they were not enforced but routinely passed along to principals with no more than a suggestion that everything be done "that can be done to live up to the recommendations of the dietician." Problems were thrown back into the laps of principals, who were to "see what can be done about them in a constructive way." Despite the department's regulatory authority, which tied grants to the maintenance of standards, there was no stern intervention on behalf of the children, so that even the most egregious neglect by church authorities and principals could drag on unresolved for years. In light of such careless management, what Hamilton wrote of Elkhorn school in 1944 might stand as the motto of the system: "It is not being operated, it is just running."

In reviewing the long administrative and financial history of the system — the way the vision of residential education was made real — there can be no dispute: the churches and the government did not, in any thoughtful fashion, care for the children they presumed to parent. While this is traceable to systemic problems, particularly the lack of financial resources, the persistence of those problems and the unrelieved neglect of the children can be explained only in the context of another deficit — the lack of moral resources, the abrogation of parental responsibility. The avalanche of reports on the condition of children — hungry, malnourished, ill-clothed, dying of tuberculosis, overworked — failed to move either the churches or successive governments past the point of intention and on to concerted and effective remedial action.
Neglect was routinely ignored, and without remedial action, it became a thoughtless habit. It was, however, only one part of a larger pattern of church and government irresponsibility writ more starkly in the harsh discipline, cruelty and abuse of generations of children taken into the schools. Here, too, the record is clear. When senior officials in the department and the churches became aware of cases of abuse, they failed routinely to come to the rescue of children they had removed from their real parents or, as they claimed ironically in the case of Category 3, children they had rescued from situations of neglect in communities.

3. Discipline and Abuse

...the failure to regard the children as persons capable of responding to love.  

At the heart of the vision of residential education — a vision of the school as home and sanctuary of motherly care — there was a dark contradiction, an inherent element of savagery in the mechanics of civilizing the children. The very language in which the vision was couched revealed what would have to be the essentially violent nature of the school system in its assault on child and culture. The basic premise of resocialization, of the great transformation from 'savage' to 'civilized', was violent. "To kill the Indian in the child", the department aimed at severing the artery of culture that ran between generations and was the profound connection between parent and child sustaining family and community. In the end, at the point of final assimilation, "all the Indian there is in the race should be dead." This was more than a rhetorical flourish as it took on a traumatic reality in the life of each child separated from parents and community and isolated in a world hostile to identity, traditional belief and language.

The system of transformation was suffused with a similar latent savagery — punishment. Prompt and persistent obedience to authority, order and discipline — what Davin referred to as "the restraints of civilization" — were virtues of a civilized society, and in its homes, schools and judicial systems, punishment was one of its servants. Children removed from "permissive" Aboriginal cultures would be brought to civilization through discipline and punishment and would become, in the course of time, civilized parents able naturally to "exercise proper authority" over the next generation of children. In the vision of residential education, discipline was curriculum and punishment an essential pedagogical technique. It could, one senior official advised, "produce circumstances to supplement and aid direct teaching." In fact, he continued, in terms of learning English, it "will lead to its acquirement more quickly than direct teaching." Father Lacombe’s experience in managing the High River industrial school in its first year of operation, 1884, a year in which almost all the children ran away or were removed by their parents, led him to conclude that "It is a mistake to have no kind of punishment in the Institution...It is absurd to imagine that such an institution in any country could work properly without some form of coercion to enforce order and obedience."

Few principals would make that "mistake", and thus discipline and punishment in the service of cultural change formed the context of the children's lives. At school, they lived by a meticulous regimen of early rising, working, worshipping, learning and, finally,
resting. Punishment for "insubordination",\textsuperscript{239} for transgressing that regime and thus
challenging the authority of the schoolmasters was pervasive and to some observers
poisonous. In 1936, G. Barry, district inspector of schools in British Columbia, described
Alberni school on Vancouver Island, "where every member of staff carried a strap" and
where "children have never learned to work without punishment."\textsuperscript{240} Another critic, who
saw the same negative implications of this tyranny of routinization, charged that at Mt.
Elgin, "They learn to work under direction which doesn't require, and even discourages,
any individual acting or thinking on their part. Punishment goes to those who don't keep
in line."\textsuperscript{241}

To "keep them in line", as Lacombe's successor at High River, Reverend E. Claude,
explained, children could be deprived of food, confined or lectured. He tried to avoid
"using too vigorous means with regard to the most rebellious tempers such as blows
etc."\textsuperscript{242} but he had no cause for concern on that score. Punishment, including striking
children, was well within the bounds of non-Aboriginal community standards for most of
the period covered by the history of the school system. Comments made by the deputy
superintendent general, Vankoughnet, in 1889 on discipline —  that "obedience to rules
and good behavior should be enforced" by means including "corporal punishment"\textsuperscript{243} —
reflected such standards. There were, however, limits; there was always a line between
acceptable chastisement and abuse. Children should not be, Hayter Reed stated in 1895,
"whipped by anyone save the Principal", and if they were, "great discretion should be
used and they should not be struck on the head, or punished so that bodily harm might
ensue."\textsuperscript{244}

Corporal punishment should not become, Reed thought, "a general measure of
discipline"\textsuperscript{245} inherent in the operation of the schools, however, was always the
dangerous potential for just that eventuality —  for not only the culture of corporal
punishment instituted at Alberni and Mt. Elgin but also abuse, for situations in which
depprivation verged on starvation, strapping became beating, and lecturing became the
verbal abuse of ridicule and public indignity. For the staff, the schools were in many
cases not peaceful or rewarding places to work; they were not havens of civilization.
Rather they were, owing to the per capita grant system, sites of struggle against poverty
and, of course, against cultural difference and, therefore, against the children themselves.

Isolated in distant establishments, divorced from opportunities for social intercourse, and
placed in closed communities of co-workers with the potential for strained interpersonal
relations heightened by inadequate privacy, the staff not only taught but supervised the
children's work, play and personal care.\textsuperscript{246} Their hours were long, the remuneration below
that of other educational institutions, and the working conditions irksome. Thus the
struggle against children and their culture was conducted in an atmosphere of
considerable stress, fatigue and anxiety that may well have dulled the staff's sensitivity to
the children's hunger, their ill-kempt look or their ill-health and often, perhaps inevitably,
pushed the application of discipline over the line into abuse and transformed what was to
be a circle of care into a violent embrace. Although there were caring and conscientious
staff, not every principal, teacher or employee was of the desired moral character; outside
the gaze of public scrutiny, isolated from both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities, schools were the opportunistic sites of abuse.

And abuse there was — identified as such by those inside the system, both in the churches and in the department. Head office, regional, school and church files are replete, from early in the system's history, with incidents that violated the norms of the day. In 1896, Agent D.L. Clink refused to return a child to the Red Deer school because he feared "he would be abused". Without ever being reprimanded by the principal, a teacher had beaten children severely on several occasions, one of whom had to be hospitalized. "Such brutality," Clink concluded, "should not be tolerated for a moment" and "would not be tolerated in a white school for a single day in any part of Canada." A senior official in western Canada, David Laird, submitted a report on Norway House in 1907 detailing "frequent whippings" over an eight-year period of a young boy, Charlie Clines, for bedwetting. The "severity of his punishment" was not, Laird asserted, "in accordance with Christian methods."

The result of Charlie Clines' punishment was what became an all too familiar episode. In "constant dread of the lash", Charlie finally fled. He slept out "in weather so severe that his toes were frozen and he...will lose them." Hundreds of children ran away because, the assistant deputy of the department explained in 1917, of "frequent punishment" and "too much hard work" and "travelled through all sorts of hardships to reach their distant homes." Many, however, did not make it to their communities and when the trail was followed back to the school from which an injured or dead child had fled, it led almost inevitably to conditions of neglect, mistreatment and abuse. It was a commonplace within the system that, in the words of one local agent, "there is certainly something wrong as children are running away most of the time." Subsequent investigations would discover, not surprisingly, that "conditions at the school are not what they should be."

This certainly was the case, for example, in two quite representative tragedies in British Columbia. In 1902, Johnny Sticks found his son, Duncan, dead of exposure, having fled from the Williams Lake industrial school. Nearly four decades later, in 1937 at the Lejac school, four boys ran away and were found frozen to death on the lake within sight of their community. They were wearing only summer-weight clothes. In both cases, investigations uncovered a history of neglect and violence in evidence given by staff, children and some graduates.

At the Williams Lake inquest, Christine Haines explained why she had run off twice in the past: "...the Sisters didn't treat me good — they gave me rotten food to eat and punished me for not eating it." She was locked in a room, fed bread and water and beaten "with a strap, sometimes on the face, and sometimes [they] took my clothes off and beat me — this is the reason I ran away." Other children, including Duncan's sister, made the same charges. The sister responsible for the girls denied such brutal treatment but admitted that girls had been locked up, one for as long as 12 days.

At Lejac, one graduate, Mrs. S. Patrick, recalled, "Even when we just smiled at one of the boys they gave us that much" — 30 strokes with the strap on each hand — and when they
spoke their own language, the sister "made us take down our drawers and she strapped us on the backside with a big strap." At this school, too, food was an issue. Mrs. Patrick told the department's investigator, Indian commissioner D. MacKay, "Sometimes we ate worms in the meat, just beans sometimes and sometimes just barley." The new principal admitted that there had been a regime of severe punishment at the school but that he would bring the school into line with community norms and operate it, in regard to punishment, "along the line of the provincial public schools." MacKay's central recommendation was appropriate not only to the Lejac case but to the whole school system. "My investigation leads me to the conclusion that the department should take steps to strengthen its administrative control of our Indian Residential Schools through the full use of the privilege which it reserves of approving the more important appointments of these schools." In 1937, this suggestion was long overdue. The system was out of control; its record of abuse had grown more sorrowful each decade, and it was, as MacKay implied, a problem the department had not dealt with.

MacKay was correct. Here again, as in other areas of care, the department laid claim to authority to establish standards — its "privilege" as MacKay termed it — then failed in its self-appointed responsibility. Scott himself had laid out that claim forcefully in 1921. In a letter to the principal of Crowfoot school, where a visiting nurse had discovered nine children "chained to the benches" in the dining room, one of them "marked badly by a strap", Scott stated that the department would not countenance "treatment that might be considered pitiless or jail-like in character." The children "are wards of this department and we exercise our right to ensure proper treatment whether they are resident in our schools or not."

Unfortunately, Scott's word was not the department's bond. It did not exercise its right to "ensure proper treatment." Senior officials had made pronouncements on discipline to individual principals and Reed, when he was deputy superintendent general in 1895, had suggested that "Instructions should be given if not already sent to the Principals of the various schools." But comprehensive regulations on the acceptable means and limits to punishments were never issued, despite requests by more junior departmental employees, and thus principals and staff behaved largely as they saw fit. Children were frequently beaten severely with whips, rods and fists, chained and shackled, bound hand and foot and locked in closets, basements, and bathrooms, and had their heads shaved or hair closely cropped.

There was more to this irresponsibility than simply a failure of regulation and oversight. There was a pronounced and persistent reluctance on the part of the department to deal forcefully with incidents of abuse, to dismiss, as was its right, or to lay charges against school staff who abused the children. Part of that pattern was an abrogation of responsibility, the abandonment of the children who were "wards of the department" to the churches, which in their turn failed to defend them from the actions of members of their own organizations.

All these factors are made clear in a series of cases in western Canada brought to the attention of the department by W. Graham, beginning with an incident at Crowstand
school in 1907. Graham, then an inspector of Indian agencies, reported that Principal McWhinney had, when retrieving a number of runaway boys, "tied ropes about their arms and made them run behind the buggy from their houses to the school." Referring the matter to a senior member of the Presbyterian church, the department suggested that the principal be dismissed. The church refused, for its investigation had found no reason to fault the principal's action: he had, it was claimed, tied the boys to the wagon only because there was no room inside; the distance was only some eight miles, and the boys did not have to run the whole way, as "the horses trotted slowly when they did trot and they walked a considerable part of the way." The department greeted this response with the cynicism it deserved. Benson saw these "lame arguments" as an attempt to "whitewash McWhinney". The church held firm, however. Despite a continuing record of ill-treatment of children and rising opposition to the school on the part of parents — which led Scott to demand in 1914 that McWhinney be transferred — he was kept on.262

In 1919, Graham forwarded reports to the department from a local agent and a police constable describing the case of a runaway from the Anglican Old Sun's school. On being brought back, the boy had been shackled to a bed, had his hands tied, and was "most brutally and unmercifully beaten with a horse quirt until his back was bleeding". The accused, P.H. Gentlemen, admitted using a whip and shackles and that the boy "might have been marked." Again, the department turned to the church for its 'advice'. Canon S. Gould, the general secretary of the Missionary Society, mounted a curious defence — such a beating was the norm "more or less, in every boarding school in the country." Scott accepted this, and Gentlemen remained at the school. Graham was irate, writing to Scott that "instead of placing this man in a position of responsibility, where he might repeat his disgraceful acts, he should have been relieved of his duties."263

In 1924, Graham brought forward another incident — the beating of a boy until he was "black from his neck to his buttocks" at the Anglican MacKay school in Manitoba. When he learned that the department had turned over investigation of the case to the church, Graham's reaction showed just how ingrained and corrosive this practice had become. "Chances are", he wrote, "it will end like all the other cases" and thus would undermine further the vigilance of local departmental staff, as they believed that "where the churches are concerned there is no use sending an adverse report, as the department will listen to excuses from incompetent Principals of the schools more readily than to a report from our Inspectors based on the facts as they find them."264

Unfortunately, Graham was proved right. The agent, J. Waddy, confirmed in a letter to Scott that the punishment of this boy, and indeed of others by the principal, Reverend E. Bird, had been excessive. Bird admitted that he had marked the boy, but the church exonerated him, and the department let the matter drop. But this was not the end of it. The very next year another boy fled from the school "almost naked and barefoot" and was found after a week in the bush "nearly out of his mind" from being "whaled black and blue". One of the non-Aboriginal men who saw the boy before he was taken to the hospital warned that if the department did nothing, he would contact the "SPCA like he would if a dog was abused." Graham assumed that the department would realize that the time had come when "the services of this principal should be dispensed with." Scott,
however, asked Gould to give the case "your customary careful attention." Bird was exonerated again, and when Graham attacked the church’s investigation for ignoring everyone except the school staff, he was put in his place by the secretary of the department: "I have to assure you that the Department has dealt with this question seriously and I feel that no further action is advisable at present." 265

In these and in dozens of other cases, no further action was ever taken, and thus abusive situations at many schools remained unresolved. In 1931, Graham wrote to Scott, after yet another bad report on MacKay, "I have not had good reports on this school for the past ten years, and it seems that there is no improvement. I think the Department should have the whole matter cleared up." 266 That the department seemed inherently incapable of following Graham’s advice was part of the long established habit of neglect. But it stemmed, as well, from the fact that the department did not think it advisable to contradict the churches in these matters. The church was a force to be reckoned with in the national political arena and therefore in the school system. Calling for a tightening of regulatory guidelines in his 1897 report, Benson complained that the churches had "too much power." 267 In that light, he noted, in 1903, the department had "a certain amount of hesitancy in insisting on the church authorities taking the necessary action." 268

Some officials certainly feared church influence and thought the department should as well. Agent A. Daunt, who conducted an inquiry into a 1920 incident at Williams Lake involving the suicide of one boy and the attempted mass suicide of eight others, admitted that he felt it unwise to accept the evidence of children, for "to take action on that will bring a religious hornets nest around the ears of the Department, unless the reverence in which the missionaries are held in the East has undergone a great change since I lived there." 269 Scott may not have feared those clerical hornets, but he certainly carried forward Benson’s "hesitancy" throughout his long career as deputy superintendent general between 1913 and 1933, persistently deferring to church advice on issues of abuse. Chronic reluctance to challenge the churches and to insist upon the proper treatment of the children, together with the churches’ persistent carelessness in the face of neglect and abuse by their members, became central elements in the pattern of mishandling abuse as long as the system continued to operate.

The department was not simply overawed by influential churches that refused to accept criticism of their treatment of children or disciplining of their staff. The department was complicit. In the face of criticism, and when abuse or neglect was revealed, too often it seemed to feel not sympathy for the children but its own vulnerability. For the department, the school system was an important symbol. As plans were being laid for the opening of the Shubenacadie school in Nova Scotia, Scott noted that it would be sited "within full view of the railway and highway, so that the passing people will see in it an indication that our country is not unmindful of the interest of these Indian children." 270 He was not, however, careful of that interest when it came into conflict with the reputation of the system and the department. In 1922, a journalist passed on to Scott a letter from a boy at the Onion Lake school detailing "how we are treated", in particular the lack of food. 271 Despite having departmental reports that confirmed the charges, Scott advised against
publication, for the boy was not trustworthy and, in fact, he said, "ninety-nine percent of
the Indian children at these schools are too fat."\textsuperscript{272}

Such misinformation, which tried to ensure that the public could see the schools but not
see into them, was another significant element in the management of the system. The
importance of the civilizing mission far outweighed issues of justice for the children. The
inspector of Indian agencies in British Columbia, referring to an incident in which two
girls were sexually "polluted" by male students, assured the department in 1912 that "it
has been kept from the public, and I trust in the interest of the department's educational
system, that it will remain so."\textsuperscript{273} Members of that public, including parents, Indian
leaders and journalists, felt the sting of aggressive departmental attacks when their
criticism came too close to the bone.\textsuperscript{274}

The department may have been unnecessarily anxious about public opinion. Through
inquests, eye witness reports and newspaper articles, some information about abuse and
neglect escaped the system. None of it, however — not even the shocking revelations of
the Bryce report — elicited any sustained outcry or demand for reform. The issue of
Aboriginal people had been consigned to the darker reaches of national consciousness.
Thus the children remained trapped and defenceless within that "circle of civilized
conditions", which was impervious both to criticism from without and to the constant
evidence of abuse from officials within the department.

In the post-war era, as a part of the reorganization of the school system heralded by the
new funding arrangement of 1957 and the contracts of 1961, the department did issue
directives on punishment. As early as 1949, guidelines for strapping children were
distributed to principals. They were expanded in 1953 and 1962,\textsuperscript{275} but the focus remained
on strapping, and other forms of punishment that continued to be commonly applied —
confinement and deprivation of food, head shaving, and public beatings — were not
specifically prohibited. As was the case in other areas of care, departmental intentions to
improve standards — indicated by regulations, but by little else — were insufficient to
solve the problem.

In southern schools, and in the northern affairs system too, children continued to be
abused. From Turquetil Hall, Chesterfield Inlet, in the Northwest Territories, to the
Kamloops school and across the country to Shubenacadie, the voices of Inuit, Indian and
Métis adults who were children in those or other schools can now be heard describing the
dreadful experiences suffered at the hands of church or departmental staff.\textsuperscript{276} Writing in
1991 of her experience in both Anglican and Catholic schools, Mary Carpenter told an all
too familiar story:

After a lifetime of beatings, going hungry, standing in a corridor on one leg, and walking
in the snow with no shoes for speaking Inuvialuktun, and having a heavy, stinging paste
rubbed on my face, which they did to stop us from expressing our Eskimo custom of
raising our eyebrows for 'yes' and wrinkling our noses for 'no', I soon lost the ability to
speak my mother tongue. When a language dies, the world it was generated from is
broken down too.\textsuperscript{277}
Many of those stories, or certainly ones like them, were already known to church and government officials. In 1965, in preparation for the first Residential School Principals' Conference, the department asked six 'successful' former students to give their views on the schools. Two of them were brutally frank, describing the school experience as "an insult to human dignity." One listed the punishments meted out at the "mushole", the Mohawk Institute at Brantford, Ontario. Besides the usual beatings, "I have seen Indian children having their faces rubbed in human excrement...the normal punishment for bedwetters...was to have his face rubbed in his own urine", and for those who tried to escape, "nearly all were caught and brought back to face the music". They were forced to run a gauntlet where they were "struck with anything that was at hand....I have seen boys crying in the most abject misery and pain with not a soul to care — the dignity of man!"

Some did get away from the schools, however, and some of those children met their deaths. Other children tried to find escape in death itself. In June 1981, at Muscowequan Residential School, "five or six girls between the ages of 8 and 10 years had tied socks and towels together and tried to hang themselves." Earlier that year, a 15-year-old at the school had been successful in her attempt.

A former employee of one school reported that the principal regularly entered classrooms and would "grab these children by the hair & pull them out of their seat" and then "thrash them unmercifully with a leather strap for no apparent reason." Such incidents were not necessarily met with stern references to the directives by departmental employees. An incident at another school provides an illustration of the more common response. Two boys were beaten, leaving "marks all over the boys bodies, back, front genitals etcetera." Sweeping aside confirmation by a doctor, the department's regional inspector of schools for Manitoba conceded only that such punishment had "overstepped the mark a little", but as the boys had been caught trying to run away, "he had to make an example of them.

"Coercion to enforce order and obedience" — to the degree that it constituted a reign of disciplinary terror, punctuated by incidents of stark abuse — continued to be the ordinary tenor of many schools throughout the system. In that light there can be no better summary comment on the system and the experience of the children than the rather diplomatic description of Pelican Lake school by the Bishop of Keewatin in 1960:

The Pelican Lake [school] has over the past many years suffered a somewhat unhappy household atmosphere. Too rigid regimentation, a lack of homelike surroundings and the failure to regard the children as persons capable of responding to love, have contributed at times to that condition. Children unhappy at their treatment were continually running away.

As this description implies, the department and the churches knew something else about the system, and they knew it years before the voices of former students made the schools, their history and their consequences such a part of the public discourse on Aboriginal/government relations. They knew that the record of abuse and mistreatment being compiled by the school system comprised more than the sum of innumerable acts of violence against individual children. There were, in addition, pervasive and equally
insidious consequences for all the children — for those who had been marked and for those whose scars were less visible but, perhaps, no less damaging.

From early in the history of the residential school system, it was apparent that the great majority of children leaving the schools — unlike the few 'successes' the department was able to consult in 1965 — rarely fit the vision's model of the enfranchiseable individual. In some manner, the educational process — an integral part of which was the system's overweening discipline, the "regimentation" noted at Alberni and Mt. Elgin — was counter-productive, undercutting the very qualities that were the prerequisites for assimilation — "individual acting and thinking"; the development of "individuality and self control", so that "children are prepared to accept responsibility" and "take their place in our democratic way of life."

At the same time this phenomenon had darker hues. Local agents gave notice that not only did children not undergo a great transformation, but they became stranded between cultures, deviants from the norms of both. In 1913, one agent reviewing the record of children who had come home from McWhinney's Crowstand school, commented that there were "far too many girl graduates...turning out prostitutes, and boys becoming drunken loafers." Another agent, writing in 1918, opposed the schools because a much greater number of former students than children who had remained in the community were "useless", unable to get on with life on the reserve, and fell foul of the law. It would be, he concluded, "far better that they never go to school than turn out as the ex-pupils...have done." In 1960, a Catholic bishop informed the department that the "general complaint made by our Indian Youth brought up to court shortly after leaving school for various reasons is that they cannot make a decent living nor have a steady job because they have not education to compete with their white neighbours."

Whether the bishop was correct, and those youth ended up in trouble because they did not have enough education, or whether it was the wrong sort of education and a severely debilitating experience, was not normally a matter for inquiry. However, in the late 1960s, the department and the churches were forced to face the fact that there were severe defects in the system. The former students consulted in 1965 were unanimous in the opinion that for most children, the school experience was "really detrimental to the development of the human being." Isolated from both the Aboriginal and the non-Aboriginal community, schools were "inclined to make robots of their students", who were quite incapable of facing "a world almost unknown to [them]."

More critically, the former student perspective was confirmed forcefully in 1967 by a report from George Caldwell of the Canadian Welfare Council. Caldwell submitted a scathing evaluation of nine schools in Saskatchewan:

The residential school system is geared to the academic training of the child and fails to meet the total needs of the child because it fails to individualize; rather it treats him en masse in every significant activity of daily life. His sleeping, eating, recreation, academic training, spiritual training and discipline are all handled in such a regimented way as to force conformity to the institutional pattern. The absence of emphasis on the development
of the individual child as a unique person is the most disturbing result of the whole
system. The schools are providing a custodial care service rather than a child
development service. The physical environment of the daily living aspects of the
residential school is overcrowded, poorly designed, highly regimented and forces a mass
approach to children. The residential school reflects a pattern of child care which was
dominant in the early decades of the 20th century, a concept of combined shelter and
education at the least public expense.292

While most of the report looked at the failure of the schools to achieve the goal of
effective socialization, Caldwell did devote some attention to the consequences of that
failure for children after they left school. Therein lay an even more "disturbing result."
Caldwell confirmed what some local agents had observed decades before — that not only
were children ill-prepared for life and work in Canadian society but that they were unable
to deal with the unique reality facing former students. A product of both worlds, they
were caught in "the conflicting pulls between the two cultures" — the "white culture of
the residential school" and subsequently "the need to readapt and readjust to the Indian
culture." Central to the "resolution of the impact of the cultural clash for the...child is an
integration of these major forces in his life." Unfortunately, "few children are equipped to
handle this struggle on their own",293 though they would be left to do just that, to deal
alone with the trauma of their school experience. Caldwell did not say, and the
department never asked, how that struggle might be, or had been for generations, playing
itself out in the lives of children, the families they returned to, the families and children
they gave birth to, and their communities.

What Caldwell's report did venture was that his Saskatchewan findings could be
replicated in schools throughout the system.294 Though opposed by some churchmen, this
position was supported by others. A consulting psychologist, for example, having
interviewed and tested Inuit students, concluded that "the educational problems
encountered in the Keewatin Area are there because the Southern white educational
system, with all its 'hangups' has been transported to the North." Those educational
problems included "a range of emotional problems", including "anxious kids, fearful kids,
mildly depressed kids, kids with poor self-images..."295

For its part, the department, far from being prepared to dispute Caldwell's conclusions,
welcomed and even amplified them in what amounted to its own serious critique of the
system. Officials in the regions and in Ottawa declared authoritatively that "more injury
is done to the children by requiring them to leave their homes to attend Residential
schools than if they are permitted to remain at home and not receive a formal
education."296 This was all suspiciously self-interested, however, for the department,
pushing integration, used Caldwell's view that the schools were not an "environment to
foster healthy growth and development"297 as a counter-weight against those who argued
for the retention of a particular school or, more broadly, for the continuation of separate
and residential education. In what is perhaps the darkest irony in the history of the school
system, the department acted vigorously on its failure, never having acted vigorously in
the past to prevent the decades of "injury...done to children by requiring them to leave
home." Soon, however, the department and the churches had to begin to face that issue of
"injury" — the product of the long unbroken history of abuse, mistreatment and neglect of children and of the sustained attack on Aboriginal culture.

4. Epilogue

...hurt, devastated and outraged.

In December 1992, Grand Chief Edward John of the First Nations task force group forwarded to the minister of justice of the day, Kim Campbell, "a statement prepared and approved by B.C. First Nations Chiefs and leaders". In it, they pointed out that

The federal government established the system of Indian residential schools which was operated by various church denominations. Therefore, both the federal government and churches must be held accountable for the pain inflicted upon our people. We are hurt, devastated and outraged. The effect of the Indian residential school system is like a disease ripping through our communities.

The chiefs' conclusion was not a rhetorical flourish; it was literally true. By the mid-1980s, it was widely and publicly recognized that the residential school experience, in the north and in the south, like smallpox and tuberculosis in earlier decades, had devastated and continued to devastate communities. The schools were, with the agents and instruments of economic and political marginalization, part of the contagion of colonization. In their direct attack on language, beliefs and spirituality, the schools had been a particularly virulent strain of that epidemic of empire, sapping the children's bodies and beings. In later life, many adult survivors, and the families and communities to which they returned, all manifested a tragic range of symptoms emblematic of "the silent tortures that continue in our communities". In 1990 Chief Ed Metatawabin of the Fort Albany First Nation community told the minister, Tom Siddon, that

Social maladjustment, abuse of self and others and family breakdown are some of the symptoms prevalent among First Nation Babyboomers. The 'Graduates' of the 'Ste Anne's Residential School' era are now trying and often failing to come to grips with life as adults after being raised as children in an atmosphere of fear, loneliness and loathing.

Fear of caretakers. Loneliness, knowing that elders and family were far away. Loathing from learning to hate oneself, because of the repeated physical, verbal or sexual abuse suffered at the hands of various adult caretakers. This is only a small part of the story.

What finally broke the seal on the residential school system that had been affixed by Duncan Campbell Scott, making public the story of neglect and physical and cultural abuse, was, ironically, the deepest secret of all — the pervasive sexual abuse of the children. The official files efface the issue almost completely. There is rarely any mention of sexual behaviour that is not a concern about sexual activity among the children, which led administrators to segregate them and lock them away at night to prevent contact. Any other references were encoded in the language of repression that marked the Canadian discourse on sexual matters. Clink at Red Deer commented that
"the moral aspect of affairs is deplorable"; others wrote of "questions of immorality" of "the breaking of the Seventh Commandment." When the issue of sexual abuse emerged, this dearth of information became the first block in the foundation of a departmental response. In 1990, the director of education in the British Columbia region formulated an answer to any question about past abuse:

The sad thing is we did not know it was occurring. Students were too reticent to come forward. And it now appears that school staff likely did not know, and if they did, the morality of the day dictated that they, too, remain silent. Diand staff have no record or recollection of reports — either verbal or written.

None of the major reports — Paget, Bryce, or Caldwell — that dealt critically with almost every aspect of the system mentioned the issue at all; that fell to Aboriginal people themselves. Responding to abusive conditions in their own lives and in their communities, "hundreds of individuals have stepped forward with accounts of abuse in at least 16 schools." Women and men — like Phil Fontaine, the leader of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, who attended the Fort Alexander school — "went out on the limb to talk...because they wanted to make things better." They did more than just talk, more than just speak their pain and anguish; they and their communities acted. Steps were taken to form support groups and healing circles. Beginning in 1989-1990, abusers, including former residential school staff, were accused, taken to court in British Columbia and the Yukon, and convicted in each case of multiple counts of gross indecency and sexual assault. This set off a chain of police investigations and further prosecutions.

These testimonies opened the floodgates of memories, and they poured out before the public. The trials, though far from being the first acts of resistance, may have had their greatest impact in validating the general critique of the system. In the long history of the schools, protests from parents and communities about conditions in the schools and the care of the children had not been uncommon. Many parents had struggled to protect their children, to prevent them being taken to schools, or petitioned for their return. More often than not, however, they had been brushed aside by the churches and the government. Even the initiatives that achieved their immediate goal — securing better food or calling for an inspection of the school, for example — never amounted to a serious challenge to the way the system operated, and thus they fell on stony ground.

Times changed, however. In the 1980s, that public ground was well watered by growing concern for the safety of women and children in Canada and harrowed by reports of the sexual abuse of non-Aboriginal children at orphanages like Mount Cashel in Newfoundland and at the Alfred reform school in Ontario. Reflecting such concerns, the government set up a family violence and child abuse initiative, allocating funds for community-based projects dealing with sexual abuse and family violence. Non-Aboriginal Canadians found that Aboriginal revelations and their attack on the schools, and on the disastrous consequences of federal policy in general, fell within the parameters of their own social concerns, and thus non-Aboriginal voices joined the chorus of condemnation.
Experts working for government and Aboriginal organizations confirmed the connections made by Aboriginal people between the schools’ corrosive effect on culture and the dysfunction in their communities. Experiential testimony, combined with professional analysis that charted the scope and pathology of abuse, put that reality beyond any doubt or dispute. In 1990, the Globe and Mail reported that Rix Rogers, special adviser to the minister of national health and welfare on child sexual abuse, had commented at a meeting of the Canadian Psychological Association that the abuse revealed to date was "just the tip of the iceberg" and that closer scrutiny of treatment of children at residential schools would show that all children at some schools were sexually abused.  

Abuse had spilled back into communities, so that even after the schools were closed their effects echoed in the lives of subsequent generations of children. A 1989 study sponsored by the Native Women's Association of the Northwest Territories found that eight out of 10 girls under the age of eight had been victims of sexual abuse, and 50 per cent of boys the same age had been sexually molested as well. The cause was no mystery to social scientists. Researchers with the child advocacy project of the Winnipeg Children's Hospital, who investigated child abuse on the Sandy Bay reserve and other reserves in Manitoba, concluded in their report, A New Justice for Indian Children, that although the "roots of the problem are complex", it is "apparent that the destruction of traditional Indian culture has contributed greatly to the incidence of child sexual abuse and other deviant behaviour." Consultants working for the Assembly of First Nations amplified this behaviour, detailing the "social pathologies" that had been produced by the school system.

The survivors of the Indian residential school system have, in many cases, continued to have their lives shaped by the experiences in these schools. Persons who attend these schools continue to struggle with their identity after years of being taught to hate themselves and their culture. The residential school led to a disruption in the transference of parenting skills from one generation to the next. Without these skills, many survivors had had difficulty in raising their own children. In residential schools, they learned that adults often exert power and control through abuse. The lessons learned in childhood are often repeated in adulthood with the result that many survivors of the residential school system often inflict abuse on their own children. These children in turn use the same tools on their children.

A central catalyst in that cycle of abuse were those powerful adults, men and women, employees of the churches and the department. In the years after 1969, when the church/state partnership in education was dissolved, the churches had boxed the political compass, so that at the highest levels and in the most public forums, they supported Aboriginal aspirations. In 1975, the Catholic, Anglican and United Churches formed Project North (the Aboriginal Rights Coalition) to co-ordinate their efforts in Aboriginal campaigns for justice; they were later joined by the Presbyterian church and other denominations. All of them, however, continued at the community level their historical missionary efforts within a new-found tolerance for Aboriginal spirituality.
By 1992, most of the churches had apologized, regretting, in the words of one of the Catholic texts, "the pain, suffering and alienation that so many have experienced." However, as they told the minister in a joint communication through the Aboriginal Rights Coalition in August 1992, they wanted it recognized that they "share responsibility with government for the consequences of residential schools", which included not only "individual cases of physical and sexual abuse" but also "the broader issue of cultural impacts":

...the loss of language through forced English speaking, the loss of traditional ways of being on the land, the loss of parenting skills through the absence of four or five generations of children from Native communities, and the learned behaviour of despising Native identity.

They ended with an offer of fellowship, a re-creation of the old alliance. "We as churches encourage you, Mr. Siddon, to address the legacy of residential schools with greater vigour". In any such undertaking, they assured him their "moral support and...any experience we gain in responding to this legacy as churches."

Having only just brought an end to the residential school era, the federal government found that "the disclosures, criminal convictions and civil actions related to sexual abuse" forced it to consider that "legacy" and to "determine a course of action." It was not lacking advice on the direction it should take. From all quarters, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, the government was encouraged to institute a public inquiry. A private citizen warned the minister that refusing to do so would be "an indication of your gross insensitivity to the staggering effect on its victims of the crime of sexual abuse." He went on to argue passionately that, more so than in the case of other crimes, sexual abuse of children thrives on the unwillingness of society to deal with it out in the open. So long as we as a society permit 'past events' to remain buried, no matter how painful, we cannot hope to halt the shocking epidemic that we are facing.

In the House of Commons, Rod Murphy, the member for Churchill, rose in November 1990 to "urge the government to commission an independent inquiry", which he was confident would "assist the healing process for the victims of this abuse". Réginald Bélair, the member for Cochrane-Superior, struck the same note in a letter to the minister. "How can the healing process begin without those who were responsible for these injustices publicly acknowledging the wrongs that were done to these children?"

Within the department, Mr. Murphy's sentiments and calls for an inquiry found no apparent support. There was certainly no suggestion that full public disclosure would have any therapeutic value. Files covering the years 1990 to 1992 reveal that the department accepted the basic premise that the schools' extensive record of abuse meant that "many young innocent people have suffered" and that the system had contributed to the "loss of culture and familial disruption." It was recognized that the "serious psychological, emotional and social sequelae of child sexual abuse are well established" and that "there was a need to address these problems among former victims...their families and communities." On the question of how that should be done it was first
suggested that "Although much of the abuse has happened in the past, the department must take some responsibility and offer some solutions to this very serious problem." This was superseded by a more characteristically cautious "framework to respond to incidents of abuse and the resultant effects on Indian communities". On what "is a major issue for DIAND...It is important that DIAND be seen as responding in a way that liability is not admitted, but that it is recognizing the sequelae of these events."

By December 1992, when the minister, Tom Siddon, replied to the August communication from the Aboriginal Rights Coalition, the government had developed its response fully. It would not launch a public inquiry. Suggestions that it do so were met with a standard reply. "I am deeply disturbed by the recent disclosures of physical and sexual abuse in the residential schools. However, I do not believe that a public inquiry is the best approach at this time."

Nor did the government follow the churches' lead in extending an apology for the residential school system. To anyone who might suggest such a course, the minister was prepared to point out that in June 1991, at the first Canadian conference on residential schools, a former assistant deputy minister, Bill Van Iterson, had "expressed on behalf of all public servants in the department, a sincere regret over the negative impacts of the residential schools and the pain they have caused to many people." There would be no ministerial apology, no apology on behalf of Canadians, and there were no plans for compensation.

The strategy the government adopted was a simple one. Essentially, it tried to externalize the issue, throwing it back onto the shoulders of Aboriginal people themselves. Under the guise of being "strongly committed to the principles of self-government", as Mr. Siddon informed the Aboriginal Rights Coalition in December 1992, the government would concentrate its efforts on "enabling First Nations to design and develop their own programs according to their needs."

It was committed "to working with Indian and Inuit communities to find ways to address this problem at the community level and to begin the healing of these wounds." To facilitate such programs the government supplemented its family violence and child abuse initiative in 1991 with provisions and funds directed specifically to Aboriginal concerns. In an echo of the old per capita debates, the coalition, in reviewing the funding, informed the minister "that these amounts are still relatively modest when looking at the deep and widespread nature of the problems."

The approach to legal issues, particularly the identification and prosecution of purported abusers, was equally diffuse. There was no consideration that the system itself constituted a 'crime'. Rather, the focus was placed on individual acts that violated the Criminal Code. Again, the government would not take the lead. There would be no internal inquiry, no search of departmental files. "DIAND will not without specific cause, initiate an investigation of all former student residence employees." It would be the task of those who had been abused to take action. They would be directed to "the appropriate law enforcement agency, and DIAND will continue to cooperate fully with any police
The assistance they might receive from the department would be "as open as possible", with due respect to "the privacy rights of individuals."\textsuperscript{335}

Such policies may well have been dictated by the norms of the criminal justice system and may even be appropriate in terms of community demands for funding and control. But there is in this a cynical sleight of hand. The government has refused to apologize or to institute a special public inquiry and instead wishes to concentrate on the 'now' of the problem, the 'savage' sick and in need of psychological salvation. This is an attempt to efface the 'then', the history of the system, which, if it were considered, would inevitably turn the light of inquiry back onto the source of that contagion — on the 'civilized' — on Canadian society and Christian evangelism and on the racist policies of its institutional expressions in church, government and bureaucracy. Those are the sites that produced the residential school system. In thought and deed this system was an act of profound cruelty, rooted in non-Aboriginal pride and intolerance and in the certitude and insularity of purported cultural superiority.

Rather than attempting to close the door on the past, looking only to the future of communities, the terrible facts of the residential school system must be made a part of a new sense of what Canada has been and will continue to be for as long as that record is not officially recognized and repudiated. Only by such an act of recognition and repudiation can a start be made on a very different future. Canada and Canadians must realize that they need to consider changing their society so that they can discover ways of living in harmony with the original people of the land.

The future must include making a place for those who have been affected by the schools to stand in dignity, to remember, to voice their sorrow and anger, and to be listened to with respect. With them Canada needs to pursue justice and mutual healing; it must build a relationship, as the Manitoba leader and much decorated veteran Thomas Prince encouraged the government to do in his appearance before the joint committee of the Senate and the House of Commons in 1947, that will bind Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people "so that they can trust each other and...can walk side by side and face this world having faith and confidence in one another."\textsuperscript{337}

5. The Need for a Public Inquiry

We must carefully assess the nature, scope and intent of Canada's residential school strategy. We must carefully assess the role of the church. We must listen carefully to the survivors. We must thoroughly review the options available to Aboriginal people for restitution and redress. We must carefully consider how it might be possible to achieve justice after all that has been wrought by residential schools.

Wendy Grant,  
Vice-Chief Assembly of First Nations  
Canim Lake, British Columbia, 8 March 1993

Redressing the wrongs associated with the residential school system will involve concerted action on a number of fronts. We make a number of recommendations
elsewhere in our report that bear directly on residential schooling. In particular, in Volume 3, our recommendations concerning an Aboriginal university include the recommendation that the federal government fund the establishment and operation of a national Aboriginal archive and library to house records concerning residential schools (see Volume 3, Chapter 3). Also in Volume 3, our recommendations concerning health and healing include the recommendation that the federal government take immediate steps to ensure that individuals suffering the effects of physical, sexual or emotional abuse have access to appropriate methods of healing (see Volume 3, Chapter 4). The remainder of this chapter addresses the need for further inquiry and investigation into the profound cruelty inflicted on Aboriginal people by residential school policies.

Our research and hearings indicate that a full investigation into Canada's residential school system, in the form of a public inquiry established under Part I of the Public Inquiries Act, is necessary to bring to light and begin to heal the grievous harms suffered by countless Aboriginal children, families and communities as a result of the residential school system. The public inquiry's main focus should be to investigate and document the origins, purposes and effects of residential school policies and practices as they relate to all Aboriginal peoples, with particular attention to the manner and extent of their impact on individuals and families across several generations, on communities, and on Aboriginal society as a whole. The inquiry should conduct public hearings across the country, with sufficient funding to enable those affected to testify. The inquiry should be empowered to commission research and analysis to assist in gaining an understanding of the nature and effects of residential school policies. It should be authorized to recommend whatever remedial action it believes necessary for governments and churches to ameliorate the conditions created by the residential school experience. Where appropriate, such remedies should include apologies from those responsible, compensation on a collective basis to enable Aboriginal communities to design and administer programs that assist the healing process and rebuild community life, and funding for the treatment of affected people and their families.

We believe that a public inquiry into residential schools is an appropriate social and institutional forum to enable Aboriginal people to do what we and others before us have suggested is necessary: to stand in dignity, voice their sorrow and anger, and be listened to with respect. It has often been noted that public inquiries perform valuable social functions. In the words of Gerald Le Dain, a public inquiry has certain things to say to government but it also has an effect on perceptions, attitudes and behaviour. Its general way of looking at things is probably more important in the long run than its specific recommendations. It is the general approach towards a social problem that determines the way in which a society responds to it. There is much more than law and governmental action involved in the social response to a problem. The attitudes and responses of individuals at the various places at which they can affect the problem are of profound importance.

What gives an inquiry of this kind its social function is that it becomes, whether it likes it or not, part of this ongoing social process. There is action and interaction...Thus this instrument, supposedly merely an extension of Parliament, may have a dimension which
passes beyond the political process into the social sphere....The decision to institute an inquiry of this kind is a decision not only to release an investigative technique but a form of social influence as well.340

A public inquiry is also an appropriate instrument to perform the investigative function necessary to understand fully the nature and ramifications of residential school policies. As Marius Tunngilik told us at our public hearings, "We need to know why we were subjected to such treatment in order that we may begin to understand and heal."341 A public inquiry benefits from independence and flexibility in this regard. As stated in a working paper of the Law Reform Commission of Canada,

Investigatory commissions supplement the activities of the mainstream institutions of government. They may investigate government itself, a function that must clearly fall to some body outside the executive and public service. They possess an objectivity and freedom from time constraints not often found in the legislature. They can deal with questions that do not require the application of substantive law by the courts. And they can reasonably investigate and interpret matters not wholly within the competence of Canada's various police forces.342

Given the range of subjects contemplated by our terms of reference, it was not possible for the Royal Commission to perform these social and investigative functions to the extent necessary to do justice to those harmed by the effect of Canada's residential school system. We hope that this chapter of our report opens a door on a part of Canadian history that has remained firmly closed for too long. In our view, however, much more public scrutiny and investigation are needed. A public inquiry into Canada's residential school system would be an indispensable first step toward a new relationship of faith and mutual confidence.

Recommendations

The Commission recommends that

1.10.1

Under Part I of the Public Inquiries Act, the government of Canada establish a public inquiry instructed to
(a) investigate and document the origins and effects of residential school policies and practices respecting all Aboriginal peoples, with particular attention to the nature and extent of effects on subsequent generations of individuals and families, and on communities and Aboriginal societies;

(b) conduct public hearings across the country with sufficient funding to enable the testimony of affected persons to be heard;

(c) commission research and analysis of the breadth of the effects of these policies and practices;
(d) investigate the record of residential schools with a view to the identification of abuse and what action, if any, is considered appropriate; and

(e) recommend remedial action by governments and the responsible churches deemed necessary by the inquiry to relieve conditions created by the residential school experience, including as appropriate,

• apologies by those responsible;

• compensation of communities to design and administer programs that help the healing process and rebuild their community life; and

• funding for treatment of affected individuals and their families.

1.10.2
A majority of commissioners appointed to this public inquiry be Aboriginal.

1.10.3
The government of Canada fund establishment of a national repository of records and video collections related to residential schools, co-ordinated with planning of the recommended Aboriginal Peoples’ International University (see Volume 3, Chapter 5) and its electronic clearinghouse, to

• facilitate access to documentation and electronic exchange of research on residential schools;

• provide financial assistance for the collection of testimony and continuing research;

• work with educators in the design of Aboriginal curriculum that explains the history and effects of residential schools; and

• conduct public education programs on the history and effects of residential schools and remedies applied to relieve their negative effects.

Notes:
1 This chapter is based on extensive original research conducted for the Royal Commission by John Milloy of Trent University. Research on the school system was conducted in a number of archives: the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa, the Presbyterian, Anglican and United church archives in Toronto, and the Deschatelets Archives of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate in Ottawa. These represent the most
significant public documentary collections for the history of the school system. There are, however, other records in regional, provincial and diocesan archives throughout Canada.

Research was also conducted at the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development on approximately 6,000 residential school files that are still held by the department. The Royal Commission secured access to this documentation only after protracted and difficult negotiations; these were eventually successful, but they seriously delayed completion of the project. Only one member of the research team was allowed to review the material and then only after signing an agreement setting out a detailed research protocol and obtaining an ‘enhanced reliability’ security clearance.

Information that fell, in the department’s determination, within the bounds of solicitor/client privilege or confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada within the last 20 years was not made available. All other files, including those carrying access restrictions (‘Confidential’ or ‘Protected’, for example) were to be made available. Most critically, access to the departmental collection was granted under the provisions of the Privacy Act, which stipulates that no disclosure of personal information, in the meaning of the act, can be made in a form that could reasonably be expected to identify the individual to whom it relates. The foregoing text and footnotes and these notes were written to comply with that stipulation.

The following abbreviations are used in the notes:

INAC - files (stored at the headquarters of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in Hull, Quebec) that come under the Privacy Act restrictions

NAC - National Archives of Canada
MG - Manuscript Group
RG - Record Group
RG10 - Indian Affairs records (held by the National Archives)
RG85 - Northern Affairs records (held by the National Archives)
MR - Microfilm Reel


National Archives of Canada (NAC), Record Group 10 (RG10), volume 6039, file 160-1, MR C 8152, F. Oliver to Joint Church Delegation, 21 March 1908.

NAC RG10, volume 3674, file 11422, MR C 10118, To Sir John A. Macdonald from the Archbishop of Quebec, February 1883, and volume 3647, file 8128, MR C 10113, To the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs from A. Sutherland, 30 July 1883.


Annual Report 1890, p. xii.


NAC RG10, volume 3947, file 123764, MR C 10166, To the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs from Inspector J.A. Macrae, 7 December 1900.


Relatively few schools were established in Quebec, however, for reasons that are not entirely clear. It may have been because the major portion of the Aboriginal population that concerned the Catholic church was served by a day school system that had emerged in the southern part of the province before Confederation. Or it could have been because the Catholic church’s missionary focus and energy were concentrated, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, on the Canadian west and north-west, very much in
competition with a similar advance of the Protestant churches into those regions. In those regions and in British Columbia, Catholic residential schools dominated.

From the outset the position taken on the education of Métis children in residential schools was rather ambiguous. The deputy superintendent general, J. Smart, noted in October 1899 (see NAC RG10, volume 3931, file 117377, MR C 10163, To the Secretary from D. Laird, 27 August 1900) that although he did not consider it appropriate “that the children of the Half-Breeds proper, of Manitoba and the Territories, should be admitted into Indian schools and be paid for by the Department—all children, even those of mixed blood, whether legitimate or not, who live upon an Indian Reserve and whose parents on either side live as Indians upon a Reserve, even if they are not annuitants, should be eligible for admission to the schools.” There was, however, no hard and fast policy until the 1911 contract, clause 4(b) of which stated, “No Half-breed child shall be admitted to the said schools unless Indian children cannot be obtained to complete the number authorized [for any particular school]—in which event the Superintendent General may in his discretion permit the admission of any Half-breed child; but the Superintendent General will not pay any grant for any such Half-breed pupil—nor any part of the cost of its maintenance or education whatever.” (Correspondence and Agreement relating to the Maintenance and Management of Indian Boarding Schools [Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1911].) This policy was maintained throughout the rest of the history of the system.

It is impossible to determine the number of Aboriginal children who attended the schools over the life of the system. Estimates have been given. In T. Lascelles, OMI, “Indian Residential Schools”, The Canadian Catholic Review 10/5 (May 1992), it is suggested that fewer than one in six attended. In his study, “Attendance at Indian Residential Schools in British Columbia, 1890-1920”, B.C. Studies 44 (Winter 1979-80), James Redford concluded that only 17.6 per cent of children aged 6 to 15 attended residential schools in British Columbia in 1901 and that the proportion rose to 22.3 per cent in 1920. In “Owen Glendower, Hotspur, and Canadian Indian Policy”, Ethnohistory 37/4 (Fall 1990), J.R. Miller concluded that “the system never reached more than a minority of young Indians and Inuit.” In fact, the extant school records for the system as a whole are not complete enough to allow useful calculations to be made. Given that fact, this text relies on annual enrolment lists found in NAC RG10 files, INAC files and the tabular statements in annual reports. These give only total enrolments per year, however, and cannot be used to determine the number of children who had a residential school experience. Any figures, including the minorities mentioned by Lascelles, Redford and Miller, are dangerously misleading unless they are fully contextualized. The impact of the system was felt not only by the children who attended schools but by the families and communities that were deprived of their children and had to deal subsequently with children who returned damaged from the schools. In that sense, communities, parents and, indeed, children later born to former students of the residential schools were all ‘enroled’.

NAC RG10, volume 3818, file 57799, MR C 10143, Reed Report (1889).

18 NAC RG10, volume 3647, file 8128, MR C 10113, To Indian Commissioner, Regina, from J.A. Macrae, 18 December 1886.

19 Macrae to Indian Commissioner (cited in note 18).

20 Annual Report 1897, p. xxvi.

21 Annual Report 1888, pp. ix-x.

22 Macrae to Indian Commissioner (cited in note 18).

23 Davin Report (cited in note 6).


26 NAC RG10, volume 6039, file 160-1, MR C 8152, To the Minister from the Archbishop of St. Boniface, 30 November 1912.

27 General Synod Archives, GS 75-103, Series 1-14, Box 15, MSCC Blake Correspondence, To S.H. Blake from F. Oliver, 28 January 1908.

28 Annual Report 1889, p. xi.

29 Annual Report 1890, p. xii.


31 Davin Report (cited in note 6).

32 L. Vankoughnet to Sir John A. MacDonald (cited in note 9).

33 Annual Report 1895, p. xxii.

34 Annual Report 1891.

36 NAC RG10, volume 6040, file 160-3A, MR C 8153, Memorandum of the Convention of the Catholic Principals of Residential Schools held at Lebrett, Saskatchewan, 28 and 29 August 1924.

37 Annual Report 1891, p. xiii.


41 Annual Report 1899, p. xxxi.


43 NAC RG10, volume 3674, file 11422-5, MR C 10118, To H. Reed from the Deputy Superintendent General, 24 August 1890.


45 Macrae to Indian Commissioner (cited in note 18).

46 Annual Report 1887, p. lxxx.

47 NAC RG10, volume 4037, file 317021, MR C 10177, To the Secretary from Agent [unsigned], Birtle, Manitoba, 20 December 1907.


50 NAC RG10, volume 3920, file 116751-1A, MR C 10161, To the Deputy Superintendent General from H. Reed, 12 July 1889.

51 Annual Report 1902, p. 189.

52 NAC RG10, volume 6039, file 160-1, MR C 8152, To the Secretary from Principal Heron, 14 April 1909.

53 NAC RG10, volume 4072, file 431636, MR C 10183, To the Assistant Deputy and Secretary from Reverend W. McWhinney, 26 February 1913.
54 See, for example, H. Reed to the Deputy Superintendent General (cited in note 50).


56 NAC RG10, volume 6039, file 160-1, MR C 8152, Principal Heron to the Secretary.

57 Annual Report 1903, p. 89.

58 See, for example, Annual Report 1906.

59 Annual Report 1911, p. 296.


63 NAC RG10, volume 6041, file 160-7, part 1, MR C 8153, Resolution passed by the Association of Indian Workers in Saskatchewan at their meeting held in May 1930.

64 Annual Report 1910, p. 275.

65 Principal Heron to the Secretary (cited in note 52).

66 Annual Report 1903, p. 89.


69 INAC file 6-37-1, volume 2, Notes on Highlights of Indian Affairs Operations 1957 to Date, Memorandum for the Director, Education Division, 1952-1957.

70 Residential Schools Past and Future (cited in note 68).

71 INAC file 6-37-1, volume 2, Notes on Highlights of Indian Affairs Operations 1957 To Date.


NAC RG10, volume 8449, file 511/23-5-017, MR C 13800, Portage La Prairie Inspection Report, Eldon Simms, 9 November 1944.

INAC file 4745-1, volume 1, Indian Education Program, 1972.


House of Commons, Special Committee on Reconstruction and Re-Establishment, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 9, 24 May 1944, p. 306.

NAC RG10, volume 6205, file 468-1, MR C 7937, To Dr. Dorey from R.A. Hoey, 29 May 1944; To the Deputy Minister from R.A. Hoey, 7 June 1944.


NAC RG10, volume 6205, file 468-1, MR C 7937, To the Deputy Minister from R. A. Hoey, 7 June 1944.


INAC file 4745-1, volume 1, Indian Education Program, 1972.
INAC file 6-21-1, volume 2, To D. Watters, Treasury Board, from L. Fortier, 22 July 1958.


INAC file 4745-1, volume 1, Indian Education Program, 1972.


House of Commons, Special Committee on Reconstruction and Re-Establishment, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 9, 24 May 1944 p. 306.


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INAC file 40-2-185, volume 1, Relationships Between Church and State in Indian Education, 26 September 1966. See also file 671/25-2, volume 3, To W. Grant from F. Misiurski, 24 January 1974; and file 675/25-13, volume 2, To E.L. Davies from R. Martin, 16 June 1975, and to E.L. Davies from R. Martin 24 March 1975.


INAC file 40-2-185, volume 1, Relationships Between Church and State in Indian Education, 26 September 1966.


INAC file 40-2-185 volume 1, Relationships Between Church and State in Indian Education, 26 September 1966.


INAC file 6-21-7, volume 1, To Mrs. L. Potts from L. Fortier, 22 December 1959.

INAC file 40-2-185, volume 1, Relationships Between Church and State in Indian Education, 26 September 1966.

INAC file 501/1, volume 2, To Assistant Deputy Minister from R.F. Davey, 18 August 1969.


INAC file 601/25-13, volume 3, A Proposal to Transfer the Control and Management of Student Residences to Indian People, January 1971.

INAC file 779/25-1-009, volume 1. This file contains a number of documents related to the dispute over the school and the final resolution. Blue Quills was located on the Blue Quills reserve, west of Saddle Lake, Alberta.

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121 See INAC file 40-2-185, volume 1, To E.A. Côté, Deputy Minister, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, from G.R. Cameron, 26 May 1966; INAC file 600-1, volume 2, Education in Canada’s Northland, 12 December 1954; and Kenneth Coates, “‘Betwixt and Between’: The Anglican Church and the Children of the Carcross (Chouulta) Residential School, 1911-1954”, B.C. Studies 64 (Winter 1984-85).

122 See INAC file 600-1, volume 2, Education of Eskimos (1949-1957); and file 603-2, volume 1, Education of Eskimos, 5 March 1957.


124 INAC file 630-101-1, volume 4, Memorandum for the Minister, R.G. Robertson, Deputy Minister, 12 August 1957.

125 INAC file 40-2-185, volume 1, Memorandum For Cabinet — Education in the Northwest Territories, Jean Lesage, 4 March 1955.

126 INAC file 600-1, volume 2, Education in Canada’s Northland, 12 December 1954.


129 INAC file 600-1-6, volume 5, Memorandum for the Deputy Minister, 11 October 1963. Large Hostels: Fleming Hall (at Fort Macpherson), Bompas Hall (Fort Simpson), Lapointe Hall (Fort Simpson), Breynat Hall (Fort Smith), Grollier Hall (Inuvik), Stringer Hall (Inuvik), Akaaitcho Hall (Yellowknife), Turquetil Hall (Chesterfield Inlet). Small Hostels: Cambridge Bay, Baker Lake, Belcher Islands, Broughton Island, Cape Dorset,
Eskimo Point, Great Whale River, Igloolik, Pangnirtung, Payne Bay, Pond Inlet and Port Harrison (Inukjuak).

130 INAC file 600-1, volume 2, Education in Canada’s Northland, 12 December 1954.

131 INAC file 603-2, volume 1, Education of Eskimos, 5 March 1957.

132 Right from the outset churches lobbied for funds. See, for example, NAC RG10, volume 3674, file 11422, MR C 10118, To Sir John A. Macdonald from the Archbishop of Quebec, February 1883, and To Superintendent General of Indian Affairs from J. McDougall, 28 October 1883.

133 NAC RG10, volume 7185, file 1/25-1-7-1, MR C 9696, Memorandum to the Honourable Charles Stewart, 31 October 1927.

134 NAC RG10, volume 6436, file 878-1 (1-3), MR C 8762, To the Deputy Superintendent General from M. Benson, 23 October 1907.

135 INAC file 600-1, volume 2, Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General in Council on 22nd October 1892.

136 To E. Dewdney from L. Vankoughnet, NAC RG10, volume 3927, file 116836-1A, MR C 10162, 2 June 1890; and volume 3926, file 116836-1, MR C 10162, 10 June 1890.

137 NAC RG10, volume 6039, file 160-1, MR C 8152, To the Deputy Superintendent General from the Auditor General, 7 December 1904. For a discussion of funding and management difficulties, see E. Brian Titley, Narrow Vision, Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986), pp. 80-82; and NAC RG10, volume 3927, file 116836-1A, MR C 10162, To the Deputy Superintendent General from M. Benson, 19 March 1904, and To Deputy Superintendent General from M. Benson, 25 April 1905.

138 NAC RG10, volume 6039, file 160-1, MR C 8152, To F. Pedley from Reverend A.E. Armstrong, 1 February 1907.

139 NAC RG10, volume 6730, file 160-2 (1-3), MR C 8092, To Dr. Roche from D.C. Scott, 27 June 1917.

140 NAC RG10, volume 6039, file 160-1, MR C 8152, Memorandum on Conference in F. Oliver’s Office, 8 November 1910. For a discussion of the details of the contracts, see file 160-1, To the Superintendent General from F. Pedley, 17 November 1910.

141 NAC RG10, volume 6039, file 160-1, MR C 8152, Memorandum on Conference in F. Oliver’s Office, 8 November 1910; School Classification and Per Capita Rates æ 1910.
142 NAC RG10, volume 6039, file 160-1, MR C 8152, Memorandum on Conference in F. Oliver’s Office, 8 November 1910, To the Superintendent General from F. Pedley, 17 November 1910.

143 NAC RG10, volume 6039, file 160-1, MR C 8152, Memorandum on Conference in F. Oliver’s Office, 8 November 1910.

144 Correspondence and Agreement Relating to the Maintenance and Management of Indian Boarding Schools (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1911), p. 4.

145 NAC RG10, volume 7185, file 1/25-1-7-1, Memorandum, F.T. Ferrier, 5 April 1932; Circular from Deputy Superintendent General, 22 February 1933; Circular, 15 April 1935; Circular, 13 July 1935; Circular, 26 March 1936; Circular, 25 June 1936; and volume 6041, file 160-5, MR C 8153, To Reverend J. Scannell from H. McGill, 17 February 1936.

146 NAC RG10, volume 6041, file 160-5, MR C 8153, To J. Plourde from R.A. Hoey, 15 October 1940.

147 NAC RG10, volume 6730, file 160-2 (1-3), MR C 8092, To Reverend Dr. T. Westgate from R.A. Hoey, 11 January 1941.

148 NAC RG10, volume 6730, file 160-2 (1-3), MR C 8092, To D.C. Scott from Canon S. Gould, 23 September 1924. See also volume 6040, file 160-3A, MR C 8153, To the Minister from Canon S. Gould, 7 January 1921; and volume 6039, file 160-1, MR C 8152, Memo for File, R.T. Ferrier, 8 February 1926.

149 NAC RG10, volume 7185, file 1/25-1-7-1, Memorandum for H. McGill from R.A. Hoey, 4 November 1938.

150 NAC RG10, volume 6001, file 1-1-1(1), MR C 8134, Memorandum for A. Meighen from D.C. Scott, January 1918.

151 NAC RG10, volume 7185, file 1/25-1-7-1, To Honourable Charles Stewart from D.C. Scott, 31 October 1927.

152 NAC RG10, volume 6039, file 160-1, MR C 8152, To J. McLean from M. Benson, 15 July 1897.

153 NAC RG10, volume 3674, file 11422, MR C 10118, To Reverend A. Lacombe from E. Dewdney, 23 July 1883.

The department did attempt to force parents to send their children by threatening to cancel rations and other “privileges” and, in both the Indian affairs and northern affairs systems, by the suspension of family allowance payments. See, for example, NAC RG85, volume 1507, file 600-3, To R.A. Gibson from F. Fraser, 16 December 1948; INAC file 501/25-1, volume 1, Circular No. 42, School Attendance, R.D. Ragan, 6 October 1958; To R.D. Ragan from R.F. Davey, 24 July 1958; and file 773/25-2-004, Family Allowances, Unsatisfactory School Report, 1 March 1967.


NAC RG10, volume 6015, file 1-1-13, MR C 8141, To W. Graham from D.C. Scott, 16 February 1925. See also To D.C. Scott from W. Graham, 10 February 1925.


NAC RG10, volume 4092, file 546898, MR C 10187, To W. Graham from Dr. F.A. Corbett, 1922; and volume 3918, file 116659-1, MR C 10161, To J. Smith from the Assistant Deputy and Secretary, 29 March 1918.

NAC RG10, volume 6482, file 941-2, MR C 8796, To J. Plourde from H. McGill, 10 February 1940.


NAC RG10, volume 6462, file 888-1, MR C 8781, To D.C Scott from Reverend A. Lett, 6 March 1922.

179 NAC RG10, volume 6332, file 661-1 (1-2) MR C 9809, To W. Graham from L. Affleck, 15 November 1929.

180 NAC RG10, volume 3933, file 117657-1, MR C 10164, To D.C. Scott from W. Graham, 10 October 1914.

181 NAC RG10, volume 3918, file 116659-1, MR C 10161, To the Assistant Deputy and Secretary from J. Smith, 8 February 1918; and volume 6479, file 940-1 (1-2), MR C 8794, To the Deputy Superintendent General from E. Stockton, 29 November 1912.


184 NAC RG10, volume 6309, file 654-1, MR C 8685, To W. Graham from J. Waddy, 15 October 1930.

185 NAC RG10, volume 3918, file 116659-1, MR C 10161, To the Assistant Deputy and Secretary from J. Smith, 29 March 1918; and To the Assistant Deputy and Secretary from F.V. Agnew, MD, 18 June 1918.

186 NAC RG10, volume 6332, file 661-1 (1-2), MR C 9809, To W. Graham from R. Murison, 29 June 1929.

187 NAC RG10, volume 3918, file 116659-1, MR C 10161, To D.C. Scott from J. Salles, 2 April 1917.

188 NAC RG10, volume 3933, file 117657-1, MR C 10164, To W. Graham from C. Stockdale, July 1914.


190 NAC RG10, volume 6332, file 661-1 (1-2), MR C 9809, To W. Graham from L. Affleck, 15 November 1929.


192 NAC RG10, volume 3918, file 116659-1, MR C 10161, To the Assistant Deputy and Secretary from J. Smith, 8 February 1918. For other examples, see volume 6039, file

193 INAC file 951/23-5, volume 1, To the Secretary from a Principal, 15 April 1934.

194 INAC file 6-37-1, volume 1, Memorandum for Dr. H. McGill from R.A. Hoey, 13 February 1937.

195 NAC RG10, volume 6327, file 660-1 (1-3), MR C 9807, To Reverend C. Cahill from D.C. Scott, 1 March 1917. Qu’Appelle School was located outside Lebrett, Saskatchewan.


198 INAC file 772/23-5-010, volume 1, Inspection Report, Morley School, located at the Morleyville Settlement on the Stony reserve, Saskatchewan, L.G.P. Waller, 31 October 1952.


200 NAC RG10, volume 6452, file 884-1 (1-3), MR C 8773-8774, Memorandum, Assistant Commissioner Perry, 16 June 1930. See also volume 6479, file 940-1 (1-2), MR C 8794, To the Deputy Superintendent from E. Stockton, 29 November 1912.


202 NAC RG10, volume 6039, file 160-1, MR C 8152, To J. McLean from M. Benson, 15 July 1897.

203 See NAC RG10, volume 6268, file 581-1 (1-2), MR C 8657, To D.C. Scott from J.R. Bunns, 25 September 1915; volume 6309, file 654-1, MR C 8685, To W. Graham from J. Waddy, 15 October 1930; volume 6451, file 883-1 (1-2), MR C 8773, To the Secretary from I. Foughner, 15 June 1922; and volume 8754, file 651/25-1, MR C 9701, To the Director from R.S. Davis, 15 July 1942.

204 NAC RG10, file 150-44, MR C 8149, Health Aspects in Relation to Food Service, Indian Residential Schools, November 1946.


207 INAC file 1/18, volume 1, To the Secretary, Treasury Board, from L. Fortier, 25 November 1958.


209 INAC file 6-21-1, volume 4, The National Association of Principals and Administrators of Indian Residences, Brief Presented to the Department of Indian Affairs, 1968.


211 INAC file 6-21-1, volume 4, The National Association of Principals and Administrators of Indian Residences, Brief Presented to the Department of Indian Affairs, 1968.

212 INAC file 6-21-1, volume 4, Memorandum on the Brief æ National Association of Principals, R.F. Davey, 11 January 1968.


214 INAC file 6-21-1, volume 4, To Reverend J. Levaque from J.A. Macdonald, 28 May 1968.

215 INAC file 6-21-1, volume 4, The National Association of Principals and Administrators of Indian Residences, Brief Presented to the Department of Indian Affairs, 1968.

216 NAC RG85, volume 1224, file 630/110-3 (6), To R.G Robertson from---, 19 November 1957. Correspondent not identified for reasons of confidentiality (see note 1).

217 NAC RG85, volume 1338, file 600-1-5, Report on Coppermine Tent Hostel, A Teacher, 1 August 1959.

219 INAC file 1/1-18, volume 1, To the Secretary, Treasury Board, from L. Fortier, 25 November 1958.


222 For a similar situation, see INAC file 1/25-1-4-1, To J. Boys from R.F. Davey, 15 August 1969.

223 NAC RG10, volume 3922, file 116820-1A, MR C 10162, To Archdeacon J. Mackay from the Deputy Superintendent General, 1 March 1895.

224 See, for example, NAC RG10, volume 3674, file 11422-4, MR C 11422, To E. Dewdney from Reverend J. Hugonard, 5 May 1891; and file 16836, MR C 10162, To F. Pedley from J. McKenna, J. Menzies and R. MacKay, 11 March 1904.

225 See NAC RG10, volume 3920, file 116818, MR C 10161, To the Deputy Superintendent General from Martin Benson, 12 August 1903; and volume 3925, file 116823-1A, To the Deputy Superintendent General from M. Benson, 1 June 1903.

226 NAC RG10, volume 3927, file 16836-1A, MR C 10162, To the Deputy Superintendent General from M. Benson, 17 March 1904.

227 NAC RG10, volume 10411, Shannon Box 36, MR C 10068, Circular, R. Ferrier, 19 January 1922.

228 INAC file 1/25-1-4-1, volume 2, To H.M. Jones from L.B. Pett, MD, 7 January 1954.


The diet at Brandon school, which was condemned by nutritionists, was allowed to remain wholly inadequate for more than six years, from 1950 to 1957.

Elkhorn School was erected just outside the town of Elkhorn, Manitoba.

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High River Industrial School, also called St. Joseph’s, was located near Davisburg, Alberta.


Mount Elgin School was located at Muncey, Ontario.

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NAC RG10, volume 3920, file 116818, MR C 10161, To Assistant Commissioner from H. Reed, 28 June 1895.

NAC RG10, volume 3920, file 116818, MR C 10161, To Assistant Commissioner from H. Reed, 28 June 1895.

See, for example, NAC RG10, volume 6187, file 461-1 (1-2), MR C 7922, To J. Edmison from J. McLean, 4 August 1917; and volume 6251, file 575-1 (1,3), MR C 8645, To Reverend A. Grant from J. McLean, 12 December 1912.

NAC RG10, volume 3920, file 116818, MR C 10161, To the Indian Commissioner, Regina, from D. Clink, 4 June 1896. The school was near Red Deer, Alberta.

NAC RG10, volume 6268, file 581-1 (1-2), MR C 8657, To the Secretary from D. Laird, 11 September 1907. The school was located close to Norway House reserve on Little Playgreen Lake in Manitoba.

NAC RG10, volume 6268, file 581-1 (1-2), MR C 8657, To the Secretary from D. Laird, 11 September 1907.

NAC RG10, volume 6187, file 461-1 (1-2), MR C 7922, To J. Edmison from J. McLean, 4 August 1917.

See, for example, NAC RG10, volume 6309, file 654-1 (1), MR C 8685, To R. Hoey from G. Castledon, MP, 19 February 1941. In this case, which is a direct parallel to the one brought forward by Laird, the young boy, having run away, froze to death. Departmental files contain many other examples.


NAC RG10, file 6436, file 878-1 (1-3), MR C 8762, To the Secretary from A. Vowell, plus attachments, 17 March 1902.

For a history of this incident and others at Williams Lake, see Elizabeth Furniss, *Victims of Benevolence: Discipline and Death at the Williams Lake Residential School, 1891-1920* (Williams Lake: Cariboo Tribal Council, 1992). Williams Lake industrial school was at Williams Lake, and Lejac was on Fraser Lake, in the northern part of British Columbia.


NAC RG10, volume 6348, file 752-1, MR C 8705, To Reverend J. Rioui from D.C. Scott, 16 December 1901. The school was located south of Cluney, Alberta, on the Blackfoot reserve.
256 NAC RG10, volume 6348, file 752-1, MR C 8705, To Reverend J. Rioui from D.C. Scott, 16 December 1901.

257 NAC RG10, volume 6452, file 884-1 (1-3), MR C 8773-8774, To the Bishop of Westminster from L. Vankoughnet, 17 October 1889.

258 NAC RG10, volume 3920, file 116818, MR C 10161, To the Assistant Commissioner from H. Reed, 28 June 1895.

259 NAC RG10, volume 6268, file 581-1 (1-2) MR C 8657, To the Secretary from D. Laird, 11 September 1907.

260 See NAC RG10, volume 6462, file 888-1 (2-3, 6-7), MR C 8781, To R.A. Hoey from Reverend C. Hives, 21 June 1943; volume 6200, file 466-1 (1-5), MR C 7633, To Reverend H. Snell from H. Craig, 29 July 1937, and attached correspondence; volume 6187, file 461-1 (1-2), MR C 7922, To Reverend A. Grant from the Secretary, 11 April 1916; volume 6342, file 750-1, MR C 8699, To D.C. Scott from J. Pugh, 25 January 1928, and attached correspondence; volume 6309, file 654-1, MR C 8685, To the Secretary from T. Robertson, 10 November 1938, and attached correspondence; and volume 6479, file 940-1 (1-2), MR C 8794, To the Superintendent General from Reverend H. Grant, 5 February 1940.

261 NAC RG10, volume 6348, file 752-1, MR C 8705, To Reverend J. Rioui from D.C. Scott, 16 December 1901.

262 NAC RG10, volume 6027, file 117-1-1, MR C 8147, Report on Crowstand School, W. Graham, 4 July 1907, and attached correspondence; To Reverend A. Grant from D.C. Scott, 19 September 1914. Crowstand School was located on Côté’s reserve near Kamsack, Saskatchewan.


264 NAC RG10, volume 6267, file 580-1 (1-3), MR C 8656, To W. Graham from J. Waddy, 1 September 1924, and attached correspondence. The school was located just outside The Pas.

265 NAC RG10, volume 6267, file 580-1 (1-3), MR C 8656, To W. Graham from J. Waddy, 1 September 1924, and attached correspondence.

266 NAC RG10, volume 6267, file 580-1 (1-3), MR C 8656, To D.C. Scott from W. Graham, 30 November 1931.

267 NAC RG10, volume 6039, file 160-1, MR C 8152, To J. McLean from M. Benson, 15 July 1897.
NAC RG10, volume 3920, file 116818, MR C 10161, To the Deputy Superintendent General from M. Benson, 12 August 1903.

NAC RG10, volume 6436, file 878-1 (1-3), MR C 8762, To the Assistant Deputy and Secretary from A. Daunt, 16 August 1920.

NAC RG10, volume 6041, file 160-5, part 1, MR C 8153, To Reverend J. Guy, from D.C. Scott, 11 July 1926. The school was located in Shubenacadie, Nova Scotia.

NAC RG10, volume 6320, file 658-1, MR C 8692, To His Parents from Edward B., 14 December 1923. The school was located close to Lloydminster, Saskatchewan.

NAC RG10, volume 6320, file 658-1, MR C 9802, To F. Mears from D.C. Scott, 11 January 1924. See also, To the Secretary from L. Turner, 23 March 1921.

NAC RG10, volume 6455, file 885-1 (1-2), MR C 8777, To the Secretary from W. Ditchburn, 31 October 1912.

See, for example, NAC RG10, volume 6191, file 462-1, MR C 7926, To J. McLean from H. Jackson, 9 September 1921, and attached correspondence; volume 7190, file 493/25-1-001, MR C 9698, To Mrs. L. Pinsonnault from J. McLean, 11 July 1924, and attached correspondence; and volume 8799, file 487/25-13-015, MR C 9718, To the Head of the Secretariat from V.M. Gran, 9 August 1965.


Several works have been published that are memoirs by former students or based on interviews with students. See, for example, Celia Haig-Brown, Resistance and Renewal: Surviving the Indian Residential School (Vancouver: Tillacum Library, 1988); Isabelle Knockwood with Gillian Thomas, Out of the Depths, The Experiences of Mi’kmaq Children at the Indian Residential School at Shubenacadie, Nova Scotia (Lockeport, Nova Scotia: Roseway Publishing, 1992); Basil H. Johnston, Indian School Days (Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited, 1988); G. Manuel and M. Posluns, The Fourth World (Don Mills: Collier-Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1974); Linda Jaine, ed., Residential Schools: The Stolen Years (Saskatoon: University [of Saskatchewan] Extension Press, 1993); Geoffrey York, The Dispossessed: Life and Death in Native Canada (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989); Assembly of First Nations, Breaking the Silence, An Interpretive Study of Residential School Impact and Healing as Illustrated by the Stories of First Nations Individuals (Ottawa: First Nations Health Commission, 1994). See also the transcripts of the hearings of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, which contain testimony from former students about their school experience and subsequent lives. (For information about transcripts, see A Note About Sources at the beginning of this volume.)

INAC file 1/25-20-1, volume 1, To Miss---from L. Jampolsky, 16 February 1966, and attached correspondence. The student opinions were circulated at the conference in an unpublished pamphlet, “Indian Viewpoints Submitted for the Consideration of the Residential School Principals’ Workshop, Elliot Lake, Ontario”. Copies exist in church archives.

There were many incidents of runaway children being injured or killed accidentally. See, for example, INAC file 451/25-2-004, volume 2, To H.B. Rodine from a Principal, 9 September 1968 æ a young boy struck by a train and killed; file 961/25-1, volume 1, Telegram to R.F. Davey from W. Arneil, 19 January 1959 æ two girls drowned; file 601/25-13, volume 3, Circular, Saskatchewan Region, E. Korchinski, 16 March 1971, and attached correspondence æ death of two young boys from exposure; and file 487/25-1-014, volume 1, To the Acting Minister from R.F. Battle, 26 January 1967, and attached correspondence æ the death of a boy from exposure.

INAC file E4974-2018, volume 1, To G. Sinclair from H. Lammer, 22 June 1981. The school was on Muscowequan’s reserve near Lestock, Saskatchewan.

INAC file 487/25-1, volume 1, Memorandum to the Deputy Minister, 1 November 1907 and attachment. The school was located in Kenora, Ontario.


NAC RG10, volume 3674, file 11422-2, MR C 110118, To the Indian Commissioner from Reverend A. Lacombe, 12 June 1885.


NAC RG10, volume 6859, file 494/25-2-014, MR C 13727, To F. Foss from the Bishop of Keewatin, 31 October 1960. The school was located near Sioux Lookout, Ontario.


INAC file 777/23-5-007, volume 1, memo from P. Phelan, 24 April 1945.

NAC RG10, volume 6027, file 117-1-1, MR C 8147, To the Secretary from R. Blewett, 21 May 1913.

NAC RG10, volume 6251, file 575-1 (1, 3), MR C 8645, To D.C. Scott from G. Campbell, 1 February 1915.

INAC file E6575-18, volume 10, To J. Fleury, Jr. from J. Tupper, 19 June 1990.

INAC file E6575-18, volume 13, House Response, J. Cochrane, 24 April 1992. This was a departmental estimate.

“Abuse report too hot, shelved æ Author says study revealed epidemic”, Winnipeg Free Press, 24 July 1992. The story refers to a report, A New Justice for Indian Children, compiled by the Child Advocacy Project of the Children’s Hospital, Winnipeg, which studied conditions on Manitoba reserves.


See, for example, NAC RG10, volume 6262, file 578-1 (4-5), MR C 8653, To R.A. Hoey from D.J. Allan, 4 March 1944, and attached correspondence; and volume 6451, file 883-1 (1-2), MR C 8773, To the Secretary from I. Foughner, 15 June 1922, and attached correspondence.


The report is noted in INAC file E6575-18, volume 10, Communications Strategy, Child Sexual Abuse in Residential Schools, n.d.


319 INAC file E6575-18, volume 10, To Bill Van Iterson from J. Fleury, Jr., 21 June 1990.

320 INAC file E6575-18-2, volume 04, To Mr. T. Siddon from ---, 1 November 1990.

321 INAC file E4974-1, volume 1, Unedited Transcript, Statements by Members, Rod Murphy (Churchill), 19 November 1990.


323 INAC file E6575-18, To J. Fleury, Jr. from J. Tupper, 19 June 1990.


325 INAC file E6575-18-2, volume 01 (Protected), Child Sexual Abuse in Residential Schools, Memorandum for the Deputy Minister from W. Van Iterson, 11 June 1990.


327 INAC file 6575-18-2, volume 01 (Protected), To Bill Van Iterson from J. Fleury, Jr., 21 June 1990.


331 INAC file E6575-18, volume 10, Briefing Card æ Will the Minister of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development call an inquiry into sexual abuse of Indian children by teachers and clergymen at boarding schools?


337 Parliament, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons appointed to continue and complete the examination of the Indian Act, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 30 (1947), p. 1609.


The Governor in Council may, whenever the Governor in Council deems it expedient, cause inquiry to be made into and concerning any matter connected with the good government of Canada or the conduct of any part of the public business thereof.

See also North West Grain Dealers Association v. Hyndman (1921), 61 D.L.R. 548 (Man. C.A.), p. 563: “The words in the Inquiries Act, “good government of Canada,” are broad, general and designedly used, and extend to all matters and considerations that come within the Federal jurisdiction.”


